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Class Action Objectors: Extortionist Free
Riders or Fairness Guarantors
Edward Brunett
This Article evaluates whether objectors to class ac-
tion settlements add to the efficiency and fairness
problems that plague the modern class action. Objec-
tor participation can take the form of (1) free market
objections to the conduct of the class suit, often a pro-
posed settlement generous only to the lawyers for the
class, (2) intervention by the state in order to better
represent consumer constituents, (3) appointment by
the court of guardians for subclasses, and (4) inter-
vention by public interest groups who seek to advance
the public interest by avoiding unfair class action set-
tlements. Until recently, legal doctrine has inhibited
or discouraged such expanded objector participation.
Substantial monitoring and free-riding costs are as-
sociated with the class action objector. Nonetheless,
enhancing the ability of third parties to present their
input in class action litigation can advance fairness
and efficiency policies. Courts must permit some
screening of the potential input of an objector prior to
deciding whether to allow full objector participation.
INTRODUCTION
The class action concept is under assault. Critics seem to
have won the day. The law and economics critiques of Professor
John Coffee and others' have had a huge influence on courts and
* Henry J. Casey Professor of Law, Lewis & Clark. I thank Leslie Brueckner, Rich
Freer, Christopher Leslie, and George Priest for comments and Becky Hsiao, Emory '04,
for valuable research assistance. I also thank participants at the Emory University and
Lewis & Clark Faculty Workshops for their insights.
See, for example, John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Action Accountability: Reconciling Exit,
Voice, and Loyalty in Representative Litigation, 100 Colum L Rev 370 (2000); Samuel
Issacharoff, Class Action Conflicts, 30 UC Davis L Rev 805, 820-35 (1997); John C. Coffee,
Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action, 95 Colum L Rev 1343, 1346-
47 (1995); Jonathan R. Macey and Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiff's Attorney's Role in
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commentators.2 Courts have emphasized "[tihe dangers of collu-
sion between class counsel and the defendant,"' characterized the
class action as "an awkward device,"4 and noted that "the rela-
tionship between a plaintiff class and its attorney may suffer
from a structural flaw, a divergence of economic interests of the
class and its counsel."' The Supreme Court demonstrated distrust
of class action settlements in both Amchem Products, Inc v Win-
dsor6 and Ortiz v Fibreboard Corp.7 Class action reformers have
attacked the very core of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23
("Rule 23") and have successfully sought a revised set of proce-
dures.8 In this climate, it is difficult to find a positive spin on ei-
ther Rule 23 or the class action mechanism itself.'
Class Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for
Reform, 58 U Chi L Rev 1, 3-7 (1991); John C. Coffee, Jr., The Regulation of Entrepreneu-
rial Litigation: Balancing Fairness and Efficiency in the Large Class Action, 54 U Chi L
Rev 877, 882-83 (1987); John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff's Attorney: The
Implications of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and De-
rivative Actions, 86 Colum L Rev 669, 671-73 (1986).
' See LEXIS SHEPARD'S, <http://www.lexisnexis.com> (visited April 16, 2003).
(confirms that courts and commentators have accepted the critique of class actions set
forth by Professor Coffee). Shepard's reports that Coffee's 1986 article (cited in note 1) has
been cited 353 times, including an amazing forty-five times by state and federal courts.
Similarly, Professor Coffee's 1995 article (cited in note 1) has already been cited 246 times,
including twenty-five times by courts, and Coffee's 1987 article (cited in note 1) has been
cited 164 times, including nine times by courts.
' Hanlon v Chrysler Corp, 150 F3d 1011, 1026 (9th Cir 1998). See also Weinberger v
Great Northern Nekoosa Corp, 925 F2d 518, 524 (1st Cir 1991) (lamenting that "class
lawyers might urge a class settlement at a low figure or on a less-than-optimal basis in
exchange for red-carpet treatment on fees").
Culver v City of Milwaukee, 277 F3d 908, 910 (7th Cir 2002).
In re Auction Houses Antitrust Litigation, 197 FRD 71, 72 (S D NY 2000). See also
In re Telectronics Pacing Systems, Inc, 221 F3d 870, 873-74 (6th Cir 2000) (referring to
the "perverse set of incentives" in limited fund class actions); Mars Steel Corp v Continen-
tal Illinois National Bank and Trust Co, 834 F2d 677, 678 (7th Cir 1987) ("[Cllass actions
differ from ordinary lawsuits in that the lawyers for the class, rather than the clients,
have all the initiative and are close to being the real parties in interest.").
6 521 US 591, 629 (1997).
527 US 815, 842 (1999).
See Civil Rules Advisory Committee, Judicial Conference of the United States,
Report of the Civil Rules Advisory Committee ("Advisory Committee Report") 2-3 (Admin-
istrative Office of the US Courts, May 20, 2002) (proposing to amend Rule 23(c) by chang-
ing procedures used to approve and notify class, changing procedures used to approve
settlement under Rule 23(e), and setting forth provisions for appointing class counsel and
attorneys' fees).
' But see, for example, Elizabeth J. Cabraser, Enforcing the Social Compact Through
Representative Litigation, 33 Conn L Rev 1239, 1240 (2001) (arguing that the class action
allows the civil justice system to enforce rights essential to a social contract between indi-
viduals and corporate citizens); Brian Wolfman, Forward: The National Association of
Consumer Advocates' Standards and Guidelines for Litigating and Settling Class Actions,
176 FRD 370, 370 (1998) (asserting that "class actions are enormously useful tools for
justice"); Eric D. Green, Advancing Individual Rights Through Group Justice, 30 UC
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The theoretical attack on class actions rests heavily upon the
agency cost problem: class members, including their leaders-the
representative parties-simply cannot efficiently monitor their
attorneys-class counsel." The customary principal-agent rela-
tionship between attorney (normally the agent) and the client
(hopefully the principal) fails to exist in the typical class action.
The entrepreneurial incentives of attorneys who specialize in
class actions transform this relationship into the converse con-
nection in which the attorney becomes the principal and the un-
sophisticated client becomes the agent, with minimal ability to
monitor the behavior of the class action counsel.11 The trial judge,
a potential monitor of the class action counsel's behavior because
of the requirement that the court approve of any class action set-
tlement,12 is to "exercise the highest degree of vigilance in scruti-
nizing proposed settlements" and has been likened to "a fiduci-
ary of the class."14 Yet, a district judge lacks the incentive, infor-
Davis L Rev 791, 802 (1997) (stressing that the availability of class actions "provides a
mechanism for access to thousands of people who might not otherwise be represented or
have any realistic chance to get their case heard"). For a leading positive theoretical justi-
fication for the class action, see Kenneth W. Dam, Class Actions: Efficiency, Compensation,
Deterrence and Conflict of Interest, 4 J Legal Stud 47, 48-49 (1975) (setting forth the pol-
icy implications of class actions, including aggregative efficiency, the ability to deter
wrongful conduct that may go undeterred if the class action were unavailable, and com-
pensation of the victim members of the class).
" See John C. Coffee, Jr., Rethinking the Class Action: A Policy Primer on Reform, 62
Ind L J 625, 629 (1987) ("[Tlhe members of the plaintiff class usually have very little ca-
pacity to monitor their agents."); Macey and Miller, 58 U Chi L Rev at 3 (cited in note 1);
Peter Newman, ed, The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law 257, 258-60
(Macmillan 1998) (explaining the agency costs associated with class actions); Marcel Ka-
han and Linda Silberman, Matsushita and Beyond: The Role of State Courts in Class
Actions Involving Exclusive Federal Claims, 1996 S Ct Rev 219, 232 (1996) (explaining the
monitoring problem "creates the danger that unscrupulous class counsel will settle a class
claim for a generous attorney fee, but a paltry recovery"). For elaboration on the demand-
ing tasks of a monitor, see Armen A. Alchian and Harold Demsetz, Production, Informa-
tion Costs, and Economic Organization, 66 Am Econ Rev 777, 782, 786 (1972) (asserting
that a monitor instructs the agent, measures inputs, and evaluates contracts and that the
monitor "hires, fires, changes, promotes, and renegotiates").
" See Samuel Issacharoff, Governance and Legitimacy in the Law of Class Actions,
1999 S Ct Rev 337, 340 (1999) (referring to recent Supreme Court class action holdings as
a statement of "the principal-agent problem in which there are insufficient checks on
opportunistic or self-serving behavior by the agents").
See FRCP 23(e) (mandating trial court approval of a class action settlement).
13 Reynolds v Beneficial National Bank, 288 F3d 277, 279 (7th Cir 2002).
Culver, 277 F3d at 915; Owen M. Fiss, Forward: The Forms of Justice, 93 Harv L
Rev 1, 24-27 (1979) (contending that judges have a duty to unravel the various inadequa-
cies of class actions). But see Advisory Committee Report p.165, 168 (cited in note 8) (re-
porting the Conference comment that the judge is not to be a fiduciary for the class and
quoting Professor Judith Resnik that the word "fiduciary" should not be used in reference
to the role of the district judge in a class action).
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mation, and practical ability to effectively monitor class counsel.6
Under these conditions, the trial court alone cannot realistically
be an effective check on the potential abuse that can arise in the
class action settlement process.16
The monitoring problem is central to today's prevailing dis-
trust of the class action. The critiques of Professor Coffee and
others also identify efficiency problems inherent in the typical
small stakes class action. Asymmetric stakes divide the class
members from their attorney, causing "sweetheart deal" settle-
ments to arise.'7 Because of the lack of an effective monitor on the
fairness of a proposed class action settlement, the problems asso-
ciated with asymmetric stakes increase. Where multiple attor-
neys represent class representatives, often true in consolidated
class actions in multidistrict litigation (MDL), common pool prob-
'" See text accompanying note 10 (explaining that courts lack the time and investiga-
tive abilities to successfully monitor and that judicial monitoring of class counsel conduct
is inconsistent with the neutrality essential to effective judging); Stephen M. Bainbridge
and G. Mitu Gulati, How Do Judges Maximize? (The Same Way Everybody Else Does-
Boundedly): Rules of Thumb in Securities Fraud Opinions, 51 Emory L J 83, 139-40
(2002) (arguing that judges are boundedly rational, often lack expertise in substantive
law, and have little incentive to spend the time needed to analyze and draft opinions in
technical cases); G. Donald Puckett, Peering Into a Black Box: Discovery and Adequate
Attorney Representation for Class Action Settlements, 77 Tex L Rev 1271, 1279-83 (1999)
(describing the "inherent futility" of trial court review of a proposed class action settle-
ment); John C. Coffee, Jr., and Susan P. Koniak, Rule of Law: The Latest Class Action
Scam, Wall St J All (Dec 27, 1995) (pointing out that in class actions [i]ndividual trial
judges simply have inadequate incentives to resist parties who want to settle and too little
information to recognize when the settlement is collusive").
" See, for example, Alon Klement, Who Should Guard the Guardians? A New Ap-
proach for Monitoring Class Action Lawyers, 21 Rev Litig 25, 44-51 (2002) (concluding
that courts are inadequate monitors of class action attorneys because of constrained re-
sources and overburdened workloads); Issacharoff, 30 UC Davis L Rev at 829 (1997) (cited
in note 1) (pointing out that courts "cannot reliably police the day-to-day interests of ab-
sent class members" because courts 'are overworked, they have limited access to quality
information, and they have an overwhelming incentive to clear their docket"); Coffee, 95
Colum L Rev at 1465 (cited in note 1) (concluding that courts are passive and accepting in
evaluating proposed class action settlements); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Settlement
Black Box, 75 BU L Rev 1257, 1272 (1995) (characterizing the class action settlement
process as a "black box" that shields the negotiation process from enlightened scrutiny).
"7 See, for example, Jay Tidmarsh and Roger H. Transgrud, Complex Litigation: Prob-
lems in Advanced Civil Procedure 121 (Foundation 2002) (asserting that "the notion that
class actions exist primarily to profit lawyers while doing little for clients has reached the
status of urban legend"); Coffee, 62 Ind L J at 635-36 (cited in note 10); Katherine Ikeda,
Note, Silencing the Objectors, 15 Georgetown J Legal Ethics 177, 188 (2001) (stressing the
conflicts between class counsel and class members because the class lawyers "have strong
incentives to serve their own interests at the expense of the class"); Susan P. Koniak,
Feasting While the Widow Weeps: Georgine v. Amchem Products, Inc., 80 Cornell L Rev
1045, 1107-14 (1995) (setting forth a case study of an inequitable class action settlement
that benefited attorneys, but inadequately benefited class members).
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lems arise.18 Some lawyers may free ride off the work of others
since they possess no clear property right in the attorneys' fees
that may result from a settlement or judgment. They have little
incentive to invest work in an uncertain common pool of fees that
may never materialize. Efficient representation of class members
is problematic in this context.
In addition, class actions present cost-differential problems
arising from the vastly different stakes, risks, and information
held by the parties. 9 There may be an adverse selection problem
because class members with weak claims can be aggregated to-
gether with those having strong claims." Under such conditions,
the terms negotiated to settle class actions may bear little resem-
blance to a result consistent with the merits of the dispute at is-
sue. Such settlements, accordingly, may well be unfair and ineffi-
cient.
This Article focuses on objectors, largely unpopular parties,'
and their attorneys who object to the terms of a proposed class
settlement, sometimes after seeking to intervene formally into
the litigation." I explore whether expanding participation by ob-
jectors in class actions will cure the pervasive monitoring and
other efficiency problems that presently frustrate class action
litigation. These would-be participants may have the potential to
add to the quantum of monitoring that presently exists. In nu-
merous cases, objectors have given courts information that allows
the court to disapprove of a settlement or to even improve it at a
Rule 23(e) hearing. 3
IS See Coffee, 62 Ind L J at 640-43 (cited in note 10).
See id at 637-39.
See, for example, Robert G. Bone, The Economics of Civil Procedure 281 (Founda-
tion 2003) (explaining that the class action tends to lead to adverse selection of weak
claims that end up pooled with strong ones because of the cost associated with readily
distinguishing claims).
2 See Lawrence W. Schonbrun, The Class Action Con Game, 20 Regulation (No 4
1997) (noting that "objectors are as welcome in the courtroom as is the guest at a wedding
ceremony who responds affirmatively to the minister's question, 'Is there anyone here who
opposes this marriage?'").
The term "objector" is usually limited to those who object to the terms of a proposed
settlement. I accept this use of the term. Nonetheless, this Article will embrace a broader
meaning of the term because class action objectors can emerge earlier than the exact time
of a proposed settlement. For example, they may learn about a class suit and oppose the
definition of a class as overinclusive or underinclusive at the time of a Rule 23 certification
hearing, or they may object to the wording of a class action notice. Objectors can also
emerge as the clients and attorneys who file copycat class actions, separate class suits
that free ride off of a previously filed class action. See text accompanying note 105.
See, for example, In re Telectronics Pacing Systems, 221 F3d at 880 (reversing dis-
trict court approval of settlement that was not at arms length); Powers v Eichen, 229 F3d
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At the moment, however, several doctrinal difficulties inhibit
the ability of objectors to monitor effectively. Courts have re-
stricted the ability of objectors to appeal, on the theory that
granting liberal appeal rights to those objecting would harm the
potential efficiency of the class suit.24 Courts also have denied
efforts of objectors to intervene into class suit as parties, and
thereby perfect their party rights to present evidence, take dis-
covery, and appeal. 5
The former problem of the rights of objectors to appeal has
now been partially clarified by the recent Devlin v Scardelletti"6
Supreme Court decision, which grants participatory objectors the
right to appeal without first intervening in the class suit. None-
theless, uncertainty remains about whether formal intervention
criteria are fully applicable to objectors,2 7 as well as about the na-
ture of the participation rights held by a class action objector.
This Article will argue for some formal intervention-like screen,
but against formal intervention itself as unnecessary.
Informational input from objectors regarding a proposed set-
tlement could, in theory, improve the monitoring problem. By
definition, the objector is a monitor, who is evaluating a proposed
settlement and then investing resources to either improve the
1249, 1258 (9th Cir 2000) (remanding, on strength of the argument of the objectors, an
attorneys' fee award approved in the lower court, because the award lacked a full explana-
tion).
" See, for example, In re Integra Realty Resources, 262 F3d 1089, 1104 (10th Cir
2001) (citing Gottlieb v Wiles, 11 F3d 1004, 1009 (10th Cir 1993)) (noting that allowing an
appeal would cause the class action to "break down under the burden of unpredictable and
unlimited individual actions" and "would eviscerate the utility of the class action suit"); In
re Joint Eastern and Southern District Asbestos Litigation, 78 F3d 764, 779 (2d Cir 1996)
(denying the right of an insurer to appeal); Rosenbaum v MacAllister, 64 F3d 1439, 1442
(10th Cir 1995) (rejecting right to appeal on all issues but the propriety of attorneys' fees,
on the theory that "there is always likely to be one" objecting party to a settlement who, if
allowed, would slow down ultimate benefits to members of the class); Guthrie v Evans, 815
F2d 626, 628 (l1th Cir 1987) (holding that class members must intervene in order to have
standing to appeal).
See, for example, Crawford v Equifax Payment Services, Inc, 201 F3d 877, 881 (7th
Cir 2000) ("Only when the class members suspect that the representative is not acting in
their best interests is there a need to intervene."); Gottlieb, 11 F3d at 1008 (10th Cir 1993)
(requiring an intervenor to demonstrate that his interest was "typical" as a prerequisite to
appeal).
" 536 US 1 (2002) (allowing a person who had objected to a proposed settlement at a
Rule 23(e) hearing to appeal without first intervening to become a formal party).
27 See, for example, In re General American Life Insurance Co Sales Practices Litiga-
tion, 302 F3d 799, 800 (8th Cir 2002) (limiting the holding of Devlin to class actions where
class members have no ability to opt out, despite the broad nature of the Devlin opinion);
Ballard v Advance America, 79 SW3d 835, 837 (Ark 2002) (distinguishing Devlin because
the objector had the ability to opt out and thereby avoid the binding nature of settlement).
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settlement terms or reject the settlement. Assuming the value of
such objector input, a policy of liberalizing the ability to object
and intervene in class actions would provide efficiency. Such a
change may also advance fairness policies by broadening partici-
pation and the ability to be heard. Objectors create an adversary
contest, usually regarding the difficult process of settlement ap-
proval, and thereby can perform a positive function.
Assuming the inevitable value of objector input, however,
paints a naive and overly optimistic picture of the objector's role
in the modern class action. Several problems plague the process
of objecting into class actions. First, there is the problem of moni-
toring the monitor. The degree of monitoring by objectors may not
be efficient. Clients of counsel who object may be unable to moni-
tor their own attorneys effectively. Some objecting by attorneys
who represent small stakes plaintiffs may be only an effort to ob-
tain attorneys fees' for the objecting attorney. Such claim-
jumping attorneys are able to free ride off the efforts of the initial
class counsel, who had already identified an alleged legal wrong
and spent considerable time procuring a settlement. Objectors
and their attorneys may be engaged in a form of extortion, seek-
ing to hold up court approval of a settlement in exchange for a
piece of a limited settlement pot.28 Their efforts may increase the
transaction costs of administering the class action-no small
amount-without any net gain in the quality of a settlement.
Not all objectors, however, will have such nefarious inten-
tions. In addition to focusing upon the typical monitor-an absent
class member unhappy with a proposed settlement-this Article
will focus on several other types of emerging monitors who have
the potential to monitor the class more productively. One such
party is the public interest group monitor. At present, several
public interest groups routinely seek intervention to participate
in critiquing allegedly unfair proposed class actions settlements.
Both Public Citizen and the Trial Lawyers for Public Justice
Class Action Abuse Prevention Project have repeatedly repre-
sented objectors to proposed class action settlements. 9 As such
' See, for example, Patrick Woolley, Rethinking the Adequacy of Adequate Represen-
tation, 75 Tex L Rev 571, 618 (1997) (explaining extortion by class members who "threaten
disruption of the [proposed] settlement . . . to obtain a disproportionate amount of the
settlement fund").
See Trial Lawyers for Public Justice, Class Action Abuse Prevention Project, avail-
able online at <http'//www.tlpj.org/keycurrent_cases.htm> (visited April 7, 2003) (sum-
marizing class action cases where a public interest group has been able to improve the
settlement terms or to obtain judicial disapproval of an allegedly unfair settlement); Pub-
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input involves attorneys monitoring other attorneys, there is rea-
son to be enthusiastic about the increasing degree of public inter-
est group monitoring. Such monitoring has costs, however, and
only limited resources.
A second potential monitor of the behavior of class action at-
torneys is a court-appointed guardian ad litem for objectors and
potential objectors to a proposed settlement. Professor Coffee has
proposed such a concept by suggesting that courts appoint sepa-
rate attorneys for future claimants."0 This process of appointing a
legal representative for one unable to adequately advance legal
rights is a respected technique in trust litigation, illustrated in
the landmark case of Mullane v Central Hanover Bank and Trust
Co. 3 While costly and clearly of limited strategic use in specific
contexts, there is reason to think that timely appointed guardian
attorneys might successfully monitor counsel who purport to rep-
resent the class.
The state is another potentially useful monitor of class action
abuse. A federal agency or a state Attorney General's office has
often provided input into the fairness of a proposed class action
settlement or has even purported to represent the class itself.32
The impact of governmental bodies objecting into class suits
should help produce a settlement consistent with the public in-
terest. It seems intuitive that the state can monitor class action
plaintiffs' attorneys and their opposing counsel. Administrative
lic Citizen, Public Citizen's Involvement in Class Action Settlements, available online at
<http://www.citizen.org/litigation/briefs/class-action/articles.cfm?ID=552> (visited April 7,
2003) (listing and describing thirty-six class action settlements that Public Citizen, a
public interest group, objected to and claiming that the objection process improved the
results for the members of the class).
Coffee, 95 Colum L Rev at 1444-46 (cited in note 1). See also Robert G. Bone, at
295-96 (cited in note 20) (listing appointment of a guardian ad litem and greater use of
special masters as a way to "create more of an adversary contest, and improve the infor-
mation available to contesting parties and the court").
" 339 US 306, 316-17 (1950) (holding that attorney who was appointed to represent
income beneficiaries prevailed in a due process notice battle over the second attorney
appointed to represent principal beneficiaries).
32 See, for example, Heaton v Monogram Credit Card Bank of Georgia, 297 F3d 416,
420 (5th Cir 2002) (intervention by FDIC into class action alleging credit card fees to be
illegal); In re Prudential Insurance Co of America Sales Practices Litigation, 148 F3d 283,
298 (3d Cir 1998) (illustrating the intervention by the Massachusetts Insurance Commis-
sioner, the Attorney General, and the Texas Insurance Commission into a class action
litigation brought by life insurance policyholders alleging fraudulent sales practices);
Texas v American Tobacco Co, 14 F Supp 2d 956, 962 (E D Tex 1997) (approving a state
parens patriae action seeking recovery of Medicaid losses against the tobacco industry);
Edward Brunet, Improving Class Action Efficiency by Expanded Use of Parens Patriae
Suits and Intervention, 74 Tulane L Rev 1919, 1932-34 (2000) (concluding that the state
can be an effective monitor of class action settlements).
410 [2003:
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agency attorneys are specialists who should have the appropriate
incentives to monitor effectively, and they lack the opportunism
faced by private counsel representing objectors.
The promise of such government intervention into class ac-
tion suits may have some limitations. It carries high costs for
government bodies that face increasing budget pressures. In ad-
dition, there are information costs associated with learning about
potential class action abuse. Class actions involving a state's citi-
zens are often settled without any notice to the state.
This Article will focus on these various types of participation
by objectors. My general thesis is that a closed, private procedure
in which a trial judge assesses a proposed class action settlement
with only input from class counsel and defense counsel is far less
efficient or fair than a procedure in which input is received from
one or more objectors. I concede that objectors may be the least
popular litigation participants in the history of civil procedure. In
my research I have spoken with counsel who described objectors
as "warts on the class action process," and I also found references
to objectors as "pond scum"3 and "bottom feeders."" While I ac-
knowledge, and will develop, the problem of the obvious costs
caused by those free-riding objectors who contribute nothing new
to a class action, I conclude that the law regarding objectors to
class actions should be slightly liberalized to provide a more par-
ticipatory process when assessing class action settlements. I will
also argue that efficiency and fairness are not polar opposites in
this area. By increasing fairness through liberalizing the ability
See, for example, Bob Van Voris, Flight Attendants Object to Smoke Deal, Nati L J
A6 (Jan 19, 1998) (reporting that class counsel Stanley Rosenblatt was "clearly irritatted]"
by the filing of objections to the class action filed by him and his wife on behalf of flight
attendants exposed to secondhand smoke, and quoting his question that "When my wife
and I were busting our asses for six-and-a-half years since 1991, where was [objector Pub-
lic Citizen staff attorney Alan] Morrison?"); Bob Van Voris, Plaintiff Bar Divided by Set-
tlements; Class Action Abuse, Natl L J Al (Feb 23, 1998) (reporting that objecting attorney
Alan Morrison of Public Citizen, who objected to a proposed settlement in which class
counsel was to receive forty-nine million dollars, but the client class members were to
receive nothing, was told, "You are scum; you are absolute scum," by lead plaintiff counsel
Stanley Rosenblatt in a Miami courtroom); Henry J. Reske, Two Wins for Class Action
Objectors, 82 ABA J 36 (June 1996) (quoting Professor John Coffee that in early class
action suits, objectors were a "kind of gadflies" who were not taken very seriously).
See Van Voris, Plaintiff Bar Divided, Natl L J at A22 (cited in note 33) (noting that
class action critics say that "many private objectors are no better than the settlement
architects" and referring to objectors as "legal freebooters"); Bob Van Voris, $98M Diet
Drug Settlement in Jeopardy, Natl L J A6 (Mar 8, 1999) (quoting class action lawyer Ar-
nold Levin, who compared one class action objector to Mary Poppins because "he drops in
at the end" and describes the objector's method as "[wiherever he can find a client, he
objects").
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to object into class suits, courts will be able to receive valuable
information that should improve the final assessment of a set-
tlement. The dominant Mathews v Eldridge5 right-to-be-heard
ethos equates due process with instrumental litigation accuracy,
thereby justifying a class action model directed toward enhancing
informational input proffered to the court. In this sense, effi-
ciency and fairness can be complementary policies and need not
invariably be traded off against one another.36
This Article about objectors intends to cover the costs and
-benefits of allowing added objector participation. Part III focuses
on this issue most specifically. It also distinguishes carefully be-
tween the private sector objector attorney and public sector objec-
tions filed by lawyers who work for the state or for public interest
groups or as adjuncts to an Article III judge. Before analyzing the
objector process, I begin in Part II by outlining the law and policy
implications of intervention by third parties into already pending
cases. Intervention is linked directly to the class action objection
procedure in various ways. First, class action objectors, usually
absent members of the class, are often outsiders to the litigation.
Hence, courts may want to assess, as they do with proposed in-
tervention petitions, the costs and benefits of the input advanced
by objectors before welcoming full objector participation.37 Second,
prior doctrine forced counsel representing the objectors to file an
intervention petition in order to preserve the opportunity to ap-
peal.38 Because of the pre-Devlin law, many class action objectors
have sought to intervene into class actions and, accordingly, have
been labeled as intervenors. Although intervention and objector
participation in class suits are surely different concepts, their
analytic similarity and past linkage requires a close initial look at
the policies underlying third-party intervention into a case.
The position of objectors and judges in evaluating proposed
settlement terms is similar. The trial judge and the objector are
outside of the settlement process, and may lack the information
424 US 319, 333 (1976).
See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 342-50 (Harvard 1971) (including efficiency
policies in a global conception of fairness).
17 See text accompanying notes 42 and 60.
" See, for example, In re General American Life Insurance. Co Sales Practices Litiga-
tion, 268 F3d 627, 632 (8th Cir 2001) (requiring intervenor party status in order for a class
action objector to appeal); Gottlieb, 11 F3d at 1009 (mandating intervention by objectors as
a prerequisite to appeal); Advisory Committee Report, 201 FRD 586, 629 (2001) (noting
that "ain objector who wishes to preserve the opportunity to appeal is well advised to seek
intervention").
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needed to effectively evaluate a settlement. In contrast, the two
typical party negotiators to a proposed class action settlement,
counsel for the class defendant and counsel for the representa-
tives of the class, are on the "inside" of the negotiation. They pos-
sess the incentives and the information essential to evaluating
the strengths and weaknesses of the case. The positions of the
various parties to a proposed class action settlement are illus-
trated graphically by Figure 1.
Figure 1
STRUCTURAL POSITION OF "OUTSIDE" OBJECTORS
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM
In Figure 1, only the class counsel and the defendant are
privy to the formation of settlement terms. They are, accordingly,
the only parties to a class action settlement hearing who are rep-
resented within the spatial triangle that depicts the "insiders" to
the settlement process. Objectors are a considerable distance
from this settlement process and, therefore, appear on the left of
the triangle some distance from the settlement. The arrow adja-
cent to the objectors indicates their considerable interest in be-
coming class action settlement insiders. The trial judge, who will
theoretically monitor the fairness of the class action settlement,
is similarly depicted at a considerable distance above of the top of
the triangle.
The thesis of this Article is that Figure 131 is a recipe for
problems in class action settlement evaluation. The graph needs
to be amended by somehow placing objectors within the settle-
ment triangle, and placing the trial judge at its apex. Class action
settlements will be fair and efficient only when all the actors ca-
pable of providing and assessing information regarding the set-
tlement are actively involved.
I. THE FAIRNESS AND EFFICIENCY OF INTERVENTION
BY THIRD PARTIES
Intervenors, by definition, are outsiders who seek to partici-
pate in pending litigation. They are situated on the outside of
litigation, but they want in. They may enter a suit only if formal
criteria are met.4" While these criteria seem mechanical and
therefore mandatory, the process of focusing on terms such as
whether the proposed intervenor has an "interest," or whether
" Figure 1 is a conceptual variation of a graph of class action settlements that first
appeared in Deborah R. Hensler, et al, Class Action Dilemmas 98 (RAND 2000). The tri-
angle depicted was entitled "Triangle of Interests in Damage Class Action Litigation." It
did not use the term "objectors," but instead, used the phrase "Public Interest" and por-
trayed this concept a considerable distance from the triangle. Figure 1 differs considerably
in other ways. The judge in the Class Action Dilemmas graph is at the very apex of the
triangle. Figure 1 places the judge some distance from the settlement terms and locates
the main settlement actors, class counsel, and the defendant, inside the triangle. In con-
trast, the Class Action Dilemmas graph simply places the defendant and the class counsel
outside of the triangle and thereby fails to note the "insider-outsider" characterization of
the parties set forth in Figure 1.
0 See, for example, FRCP 24(a)(2) (mandating a showing that an intervenor demon-
strate an interest that would be impaired or impeded if his intervention is denied and that
the intervenor is not adequately represented by one of the existing parties); FRCP 24(b)(2)
(allowing permissive intervention when the claim of the intervenor and the main action
have a question of law or fact in common).
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the proposed intervenor and parties to the main action have a
common question of law or fact, leaves the trial court with a good
deal of discretion.4'
The better intervention opinions use judicial discretion to
make sure that allowing third-party input advances efficiency.42
There is no automatic right to intervene. If applicants can dem-
onstrate that they will introduce new and helpful evidentiary in-
put into the litigation, the trial court will likely grant their re-
quested intervention petition.8 In contrast, an intervenor who
appears to introduce duplicative facts or an argument put forth
by current parties will usually fail in the effort to join a suit.44
These results will occur whether or not the intervention petition
is labeled "of right" or "permissive." Although only the latter, as a
formal doctrinal matter, is considered discretionary, in reality,
the trial courts use a healthy dose of discretion when ruling on
any intervention motion, regardless of the subtype of the mo-
tion. 5
"' See Ge.ne R. Shreve, Questioning Intervention of Right-Toward a New Methodol-
ogy of Decisionmaking, 74 Nw U L Rev 894, (1980) (concluding that all intervention leaves
the discretion to the trial judge); Edward J. Brunet, A Study in the Allocation of Scarce
Judicial Resources: The Efficiency of Federal Intervention Criteria, 12 Ga L Rev 701, 738
(1978) (concluding that both Rule 24(a) and 24(b) grant substantial discretion to the
court).
41 See, for example, In re Navigant Consulting, Inc, Securities Litigation, 275 F3d 616,
620 (7th Cir 2001) (suggesting that providing intervention can facilitate more accurate
decisions by courts); General Motors Corp v Burns, 50 FRD 401, 405 (D Hawaii 1970)(granting intervention and noting that the intervenor organization and its members "have
unique knowledge of the Hawaii automobile industry" that will help "to fully present to
the Court all of the facts in this case"); James Wm Moore, ed, 6 Moore's Federal Practice §
24.0315][a] (Bender 3d ed 1997) ("Despite the label 'intervention of right,' courts exercise
some discretion in weighing a motion to intervene under Rule 24(a)(2).").
" See, for example, Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc v Tennessee Valley Au-
thority, 340 F Supp 400, 408-09 (S D NY 1971), revd on other grounds, 459 F2d 255 (2d
Cir 1972) (concluding that intervenor Audubon Society interjects "a long-standing interest
in and familiarity with strip-mining, expertise that may be helpful in clarifying the facts
and issues in this case").
" See, for example, American Lung Association v Reilly, 962 F2d 258, 262 (2d Cir
1992) (denying intervention where intervening utilities advanced only defenses already
asserted by defendant EPA); Cajun Electric Power Cooperative, Inc v Gulf States Utilities,
940 F2d 117, 120-21 (5th Cir 1991) (affirming a denial of intervention because the puta-
tive intervenor "brings no unique arguments to the litigation"); In re Domestic Air Trans-
portation Antitrust Litigation, 148 FRD 297, 336-37 (N D Ga 1993) (denying intervention
under Rule 24(b) because proposed intervenors had not "demonstrated that their interests
are unique to them or that they are different in any way from the interests of the class as
a whole"); Moore, 6 Moore's Federal Practice at § 24.03[5] [a] (cited in note 42) (asserting
that "[i]ntervention is not favored if the applicant will contribute no unique arguments to
the litigation").
*' See generally, 6 Moore's Federal Practice § 24.03[51[a] (cited in note 42) (listing
discretionary factors used in assessing intervention of right).
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A successful intervenor is, by definition, connected to the ex-
isting lawsuit. Providing the intervenor a voice in the suit seem-
ingly advances participation or right-to-be-heard values. In this
way, fairness is furthered by procedures that allow third-party
intervention.
At the same time, intervention can improve litigation effi-
ciency. If we define litigation efficiency in terms of reaching an
accurate decision,46 intervenors have the potential to enhance the
quality of judicial decision making by introducing valuable infor-
mation into a case. Courts, like any decision makers, need infor-
mation to decide disputes. Assuming that a judge can efficiently
process the information proffered by an intervenor, intervention
47
should improve judicial accuracy.
The assumption that new information provided by interve-
nors is beneficial, however, may not be realistic. Intervenors are
sometimes imitators, who do little more than free ride off the evi-
dence already in a case. Intervenors can also delay and add to the
cost of litigation. In addition, the information put forth by the
intervenor could confuse a court or make the case unmanage-
able.48 In such a case, the informational input of the intervenor
exceeds the optimal scale economies of the trial judge.49 When
this occurs, the court should have the discretion to deny the coun-
terproductive intervention petition."
" See Brunet, 12 Ga L Rev at 715-16 (cited in note 41) (defining accurate decisions as
the optimal output of litigation).
47 I have earlier illustrated this point graphically. See id at 715 (showing judicial
output curve in terms of judicial accuracy rising after receipt of additional valuable "in-
formational input from joinder mechanisms"). See also Richard D. Freer, Rethinking
Compulsory Joinder: A Proposal to Restructure Federal Rule 19, 60 NYU L Rev 1061,
1061-62 (1985) (stressing efficiencies gained by repackaging claims within litigation gen-
erally and within Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19 particularly).
41 See, for example, Wilderness Society v Morton, 463 F2d 1261, 1263 (DC Cir 1972)
(denying the intervention effort of a Canadian citizen and an environmental group and, in
a concurring opinion of Judge Tamm, warning that intervention can make "the manage-
able lawsuit become an unmanageable cowlick"); Smuck v Hobson, 408 F2d 175, 179 (DC
Cir 1969) (observing that the "decision whether intervention of right is warranted thus
involves an accommodation between two potentially conflicting goals: to achieve judicial
economies of scale by resolving related issues in a single lawsuit, and to prevent the single
lawsuit from becoming fruitlessly complex or unending").
" I have also illustrated this point graphically. See Brunet, 12 Ga L Rev at 716 (cited
in note 41) (showing productivity curve of judicial output or accuracy falling after receipt
of unproductive input from intervention). See also Richard A. Epstein, The Consolidation
of Complex Litigation: A Critical Evaluation of the ALI Proposal, 10 J L & Comm 1, 18
(1990) (describing the costs of consolidating complex litigation and noting that "lilt is a
mistake to regard consolidation as good in itself" and that "[dliseconomies of scale may
make a good thing into a bad thing").
' See text accompanying notes 41-42.
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Intervention doctrine must be able to reflect these considera-
tions. To achieve an accurate litigation result, the court must re-
ceive only the optimal amount of information. Of course, not all
judges will be able to handle the same quantities of informational
inputs. One would expect widely differing optimal abilities of
judges. Accordingly, the intervention doctrine must have the
flexibility to incorporate the varying optimal capacities of
judges."
Several decisions have criticized the ability of intervention to
improve the net accuracy of judicial results. In In re Navigant
Consulting, Inc, Securities Litigation," Judge Easterbrook articu-
lated an instrumental role for intervention by explaining that
intervention "may facilitate accurate decision on the merits. '
While concluding that the trial court appropriately denied an in-
tervention petition as untimely in a securities fraud class action,
Judge Easterbrook stated that an intervention request, if filed
earlier in the case, could have produced "extra discovery [that]
might have led the judge to obtain the views of an expert." 4 In
other words, a timely intervention could have provided informa-
tion critical to determining the fairness of the proposed settle-
ment. Similarly, in Deltona Corp v Hoffman,55 a Florida trial
court allowed four environmental groups to intervene into a wet-
lands dispute, reasoning that "considering the complexity of the
scientific matters in question, those who presented the evidence
below may be in the best position to present the evidence before
this court." 6 The Fifth Circuit echoed this policy in League of
United Latin American Citizens v Clements,7 where it denied a
county's intervention request because its proffered input would
not help develop relevant factual issues. 8
" See Brunet, Ga L Rev at 718 (cited in note 41) (asserting that each decision maker
has a different optimal point of informational input and reaches optimality after assimi-
lating varying quantities of input).
52 275 F3d 616 (7th Cir 2001).
Id at 620.
'4 Id.
7 Envir L Rep 20224 (M D Fla 1977).
Id at 20225.
884 F2d 185, 189 (5th Cir 1989).
See Getty Oil Co v Department Of Energy, 865 F2d 270, 277 (Temp Emerg Ct App
1988) (denying intervention because the intervention petition showed no presentation of
new issues and suggesting that under such circumstances, amicus curiae participation
would be more efficient); NDB Bank, NA v Bennett, 159 FRD 505, 508 (S D Ind 1994)
(denying the intervention of an association of insurance agents who sought to help defend
banks in a suit brought by the state insurance commissioner because the intervenor raised
no new issues).
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Of course, some intervention petitions will not introduce new
helpful facts or law. Copycat would-be intervenors who advance
only duplicative, carbon copies of the legal or factual inputs al-
ready in a case should be denied entry into the litigation. They
frustrate efficiency by increasing the transactions costs of the
litigation for both the court and the existing parties. In addition,
they add complexity to the suit. Adding parties to any litigation
has a cost to both the existing parties and the court. These costs
can only be justified when the efficiency and fairness gains ex-
ceed the costs of joinder.
A court should assess the potential costs and benefits of any
proposed intervention into litigation by a third-party outsider. In
evaluating whether a jury will be helped or hindered by new in-
puts, the court acts as a surrogate gatekeeper in assessing the
intervention petition. If the court concludes that the intervenor
would hinder the litigation, the court should deny intervention,
thereby leaving the would-be intervenor free to initiate collateral
litigation in a separate proceeding. Because the intervenor is de-
nied entry into the suit, fairness policies may be frustrated. Yet,
this approach seemingly achieves a more accurate result and
thereby enhances efficiency.
Fairness is not necessarily ignored when a unique and poten-
tially helpful intervention is denied in the name of hindering effi-
ciency. The Mathews approach remains the prevailing due proc-
ess concept of natural justice. 9 Under the Mathews test, the court
examines whether adding additional units of procedural protec-
tion would assist in reaching an accurate result.0 Accurate deci-
sions are the goal of due process under this approach.61 Under
Mathews, denying participation in litigation because it may de-
crease accuracy is not only efficient, but also fair.
The foregoing analysis would appear to apply fully to all in-
tervenors, including those who seek to participate as objectors in
9' 424 US 319.
o See, for example, Jerry Mashaw, Due Process in the Administrative State 102-04,
153-55 (Yale 1985) (interpreting Mathews as setting forth a utilitarian model and criticiz-
ing Mathews as requiring a test based upon facts that are often unavailable). Although
Mathews set out a three-part test, also assessing the harm to the individual and the cost
to government of enhanced due process, the third factor in the balancing, "risk of error," or
judicial accuracy, has emerged as the dominant factor. See Connecticut v Doehr, 501 US 1,
14 (1991) (using each of three due process factors, but stressing risk of error); Carey v
Piphus, 435 US 247, 259 (1978) (referring to the Mathews test by identifying only the risk
of error criterion).
" See id at 344 (explaining that "due process rules are shaped by the risk of error
inherent in the truthmaking process as applied to the generality of cases").
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class actions. In a formal sense, only those class action partici-
pants who allege that they are class representatives are parties.62
They are the only named plaintiffs in the class action. Formally
designated class representatives are the only members of a class
with the legal right to present evidence to the court and to take
discovery. Under this style of analysis, the only way an absent
class member may participate in class action litigation is by for-
mally intervening in a suit.
Such a formal analysis, however, fails to accurately depict
the dynamics of a class action. Absent members of a class, while
not construed to be parties with all the attendant rights of par-
ticipation, possess attributes that make them seem like parties. A
blanket rule that would deny party status to members of a class
action flies in the face of reality. Class members are, in theory,
the very essence of a class action. Absentees are the reason the
class action device exists. Those who represent plaintiff classes in
class action litigation expend great effort talking to "absent" class
members, who often contact class counsel (and the court) with
questions and unsolicited input.63 A rigid presumptive rule deny-
ing party status and rights to absentees may be ill advised. Such
a rule may also be unfair in that it restricts participation to those
who comprise the class itself.
Accordingly, the need for objectors to demonstrate satisfac-
tion of intervention criteria should be reexamined. The universal
requirement that all proposed intervenors satisfy intervention
criteria certainly improves efficiency and fairness. These criteria,
particularly in their requirement that the intervenor advance
unique informational inputs, act as a real check to prevent inter-
vention that might be counterproductive and costly to the court
and existing parties. Every non-party should have to meet the
existing intervention hurdles. Yet, should the demanding inter-
vention tests be applied to absent class members? Put differently,
should absent class members who seek to participate in a class
See, for example, Felzen v Andreas, 134 F3d 873, 877-78 (7th Cir 1998), affd as
California Public Employees' Retirement System v Felzen, 525 US 315 (1999) (holding that
absent class members are not parties and must intervene to obtain party status in order to
appeal).
See, for example, Puckett, Note, 77 Tex L Rev at 1279 (cited in note 15) (stressing
that the class counsel's stake "results from extensive investment in research, discovery,
and other preparation in anticipation of litigation"); telephone interview with Leslie
O'Leary, Esq. on September 17, 2003 (class action counsel takes the position that firms
invest heavily in catering to questions from absentees).
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action in order to complain about a settlement have to satisfy the
formal intervention criteria to do so?
Certainly, some check on the entry of absentee objectors into
the participatory phase of a class action is essential. Allowing
every absentee to automatically enter a class action and take dis-
covery or present evidence would impose considerable costs and
make the class action device more unmanageable than ever. A
better procedure would evaluate the potential for duplication or
innovation presented by the applicant-absentee who knocks at
the door of a pending class action. Framed in this way, a liberal-
ized but real intervention requirement for absentee participation
in class actions may be needed.
The Supreme Court recently confronted the dilemma be-
tween the need for potentially productive intervenor input and
the formal intervention requirements of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. In Devlin, the Court allowed an objector to ap-
peal the trial judge's approval of a proposed settlement despite
the lack of any formal intervention into the case.64 Devlin in-
volved only the question of whether the objector who had not in-
tervened could appeal, and did not present the issue of whether
an objector at the trial court level could participate in the eviden-
tiary phase of a class action. Prior to Devlin, a majority of federal
circuits had taken the formalistic position that only a party to
litigation could appeal, and only those who had sought and ob-
tained intervenor status could be parties.65
Justice O'Connor's majority opinion acknowledged the valid-
ity of the earlier Martino v Ortiz" decision, which held that "only
parties to a lawsuit, or those that properly become parties, may
appeal an adverse judgment."67 However, the majority eschewed
formalism by stressing that the Court had never "restricted the
right to appeal to named parties to the litigation."8 It reasoned
that one who objects to a class action settlement unsuccessfully
536 US 1, 14 (2002).
See, for example, Cook v Powell Buick, Inc, 155 F3d 758, 761 (5th Cir 1998) (hold-
ing that absent class members could not appeal a district court settlement approval be-
cause they had not intervened earlier); Shults v Champion International Corp, 35 F3d
1056, 1061 (6th Cir 1994) (party status through intervention essential to appeal); Guthrie
v Evans, 815 F2d 626, 628 (11th Cir 1987) (conditioning appeal rights on prior interven-
tion into the case). Compare with In re PaineWebber Inc, Limited Partnerships Litigation,
94 F3d 49, 53 (2d Cir 1996) (finding that an absentee who had objected at the Rule 23(e)
hearing had the right to appeal).
484 US 301 (1988).
Id at 304.
Devlin, 536 US at 7.
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has an "interest" in the litigation because the trial court's ap-
proval of the settlement "binds [the objector] petitioner as a
member of the class," thereby triggering a right to appeal.69 Jus-
tice O'Connor reiterated this point by explaining that "[w]hat is
most important to this case is that nonnamed class members are
parties to the proceedings in the sense of being bound by the set-
tlement."" In essence, the fact that the absentee seeking to ap-
peal was bound by the settlement justified the majority's sub-
stance over form result.
Justice Scalia's vehement dissent, joined by Justices Ken-
nedy and Thomas, took a traditional formalist position regarding
intervention. In Justice Scalia's words, only parties to a judgment
may appeal, and parties "are those named as such-whether as
the original plaintiff or defendant in the complaint giving rise to
the judgment, or as '[o]ne who [though] not an original party be-
come[s] a party by intervention, substitution, or third-party prac-
tice."'71 To Justice Scalia, only class representatives, those named
in the caption of a case, possess the right to appeal.72 Because the
appellant in Devlin did not successfully intervene, he could not be
a party to the litigation with the attendant rights to appeal.
The Devlin dissent did focus on efficiency concerns, as well as
doctrinal values. Justice Scalia quoted from the amicus curiae
brief of the United States, which took the position that mandat-
ing intervention by would-be appellants would "enable district
courts 'to perform an important screening function.' 7. The gov-
ernment took an intermediate position in the case: some minimal
and functional showing of intervention by absent class members
would trigger an appeal right.74 Justice Scalia's reasoning seemed
fully cognizant of the potential for disruption caused by objectors
to class action settlements. He lamented that objectors would be
undeterred from appealing, and observed that to think that
"meritless objections, undeterred the first time, will be deterred
Id at 2010.
70 Id at 10.
Id at 15 (Scalia dissenting), quoting Karcher v May, 484 US 72, 77 (1987).
Devlin, 536 US at 15.
7 Id at 21, quoting Brief for the United States and Securities Exchange Commission
as Amicus Curiae, Devlin v Scardelletti, No. 01-417, 2001 US Briefs at 23 (2002).
7' Brief for the Securities Exchange Commission, Devlin v Scardelletti, at 9 (2002).
The respondents had contended that normal intervention requirements are required in
order to join a case through FRCP 24. Brief for Respondents, Devlin v Scardelletti, No. 01-
417, 2001 US Briefs at 27 (2002).
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the second, surely suggests the triumph of hope over experi-
ence."
75
As authority for his fear of meritless appeals by class action
objectors, Justice Scalia cited the notorious Shaw v Toshiba
America Information Systems, Inc"6 decision. In Shaw, the trial
court complained about "professional objectors who seek out class
actions to simply extract a fee by lodging generic, unhelpful pro-
tests." The district judge in Shaw had ample reason for his dis-
satisfaction. One set of counsel for the objectors had filed what
appeared to be a phony set of objections that referred to the in-
creased foot traffic that the proposed coupon settlement would
cause at Sears.7 ' The only problem was that the defendant in the
case was not Sears, but Toshiba! Counsel for the objectors had, in
the judge's terms, filed a "canned" set of objections, apparently by
taking material from an earlier case and refiling it. 9
Justice Scalia is wise to worry about the efficiency of interve-
nor input. This concern is central to the position that underlies
the better intervention opinions-some judicial screening of the
likely input of the intervenor applicant is essential to deciding
whether the would-be entrant to the case should be allowed to
participate. The Devlin majority missed a clear opportunity to
mandate systematic screening of proposed intervenor input by
class action objectors. Had the Scalia position won the day, true
extortionist objectors able to contribute little or nothing to the
case would lack any ability to appeal.
On the other hand, it is disappointing that Justice Scalia did
not probe more deeply into the problems of inadequate monitor-
ing and lack of information that plague class suits. It is ironic
that Scalia singled out Shaw for its criticism of objectors, but ig-
nored statements on the very same pages that he quoted in which
the trial court explained that "other objections contained consid-
erable merit with respect to this particular case."' The Shaw
opinion was organized in a way to describe the input of what the
court called "Beneficial Objectors,"" some of whom had suggested
Devlin, 536 US at 21 (Scalia dissenting).
76 91 F Supp 2d 942 (E D Tex 2000).
Id at 973.
78 Id at 973-74.
71 Id. Such actions justifiably expose counsel to sanctions. See text accompanying
notes 123, 181.
Shaw, 91 F Supp 2d at 973-74.
Id at 973.
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extending the date for coupon redemption, 2 which had effectively
sweetened the settlement pot for absentees.
The overall impact of Devlin is not altogether negative. Dev-
lin may increase the opportunity for objectors to complain about
the fairness of class action settlements. While the Devlin opinions
are cast in a tone that covers intervention and appeals rights
rather than class action policy, Devlin is predicated upon a con-
cern for a voice in class action litigation. By allowing the objectors
to appeal without a formal trial court motion to intervene, Devlin
may lead trial courts to be more receptive to the input of objec-
tors, who now possess the right to appeal without formal party
status.
Devlin is not the first decision to articulate such a position.
Crawford v Equifax Payment Services, Inc83 neatly articulated the
value of receiving intervenor input in the form of objecting to a
proposed class action settlement. There, Judge Easterbrook ex-
plained that district courts should "freely allow the intervention
of unnamed class members who object to proposed settlements
and want an option to appeal an adverse decision."84 It is crucial
for legal doctrine to find a way to assimilate class action objector
input. Judge Easterbrook has also noted the value of allowing
objectors to appeal, criticizing trial judges who "block appellate
review of their decisions by the expedient of denying party status
to anyone who seems likely to appeal."8
This position recognizes the value of appeals to the class ac-
tion objection process. Appeals create a healthy competition be-
tween the trial court and the appellate court. They are an impor-
tant deterrent of trial court error.86 Rather than having just one
trial court monitor a proposed settlement, the appellate process
constitutes an important second opportunity for another court to
evaluate the overall fairness of a potentially collusive settle-
ment.87 Appeals by objectors are especially important because of
Id at 974.
201 F3d 877, 881 (7th Cir 2000).
Id.
In Re Synthroid Marketing Litigation, 264 F3d 712, 715 (7th Cir 2001).
See Steven Shavell, The Appeals Process as a Means of Error Correction, 24 J Legal
Stud 379, 408-10, 425-26 (1995) (asserting that the availability of an appeal "induc[es]
trial court judges to make fewer errors because of their fear of reversal").
87 See, for example, Scardelletti v Debarr, 265 F3d 195, 214-15 (4th Cir 2001) (noting
that the availability of appeal is an important check preventing collusive class action
settlements between defendants and class counsel) (Michael concurring); Crawford 201
F3d at 881 (reasoning that "appellate correction of a district court's errors is a benefit to
the class"). See also Brief for Petitioner, Devlin v Scardelletti, No 01-417, 2001 US Briefs
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the tendency of trial courts to approve proposed settlements.88 To
be sure, appeals are costly because they expend party and court
resources and delay the ultimate distribution of remedies negoti-
ated in a class action settlement. Yet, it is noteworthy that effi-
ciency-minded jurists such as Judges Easterbrook and Posner
have willingly overturned trial court approvals of class action
settlements based upon the input of class action objectors. 9
This positive description of the role of class action appeals by
objectors is consistent with the more general approval that recent
changes to Rule 23 give to class action appeals. New subsection
23(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, added in 1998,90 pro-
vides appellate court discretion to hear district court denials or
grants of motions to certify a class.9' This change was made be-
cause of the value that appeals provide to the trial court's deci-
sions regarding class certification, as well as because of the need
to reach a firm decision as to whether a case may properly pro-
ceed as a class action.
Devlin expands class action voice, but does so at the price of
potentially expanding the opportunity for the filing of adventure-
some appeals. In the words of the Tenth Circuit, allowing an ap-
peal by a class member who has not intervened "would permit
one dissident-and there is likely always to be one-to postpone
realization of any of the benefits that might otherwise come to the
417 at 33 (arguing that allowing objections to be appealed "provides an additional layer of
deterrence against self-dealing by the class representatives and their lawyers").
See, for example, In re Cendant Corp Prides Litigation, 243 F3d 722, 728 (3d Cir
2001) (reasoning that "the unique relationship among plaintiffs' counsel, plaintiffs, and
defendants in class actions imposes a special responsibility upon appellate courts to hear
challenges to fee awards by class members whose claims may have been reduced or in
some way affected in exchange for large fee awards"); Mars Steel Corp v Continental Illi-
nois National Bank and Trust Co, 834 F2d 677, 681 (7th Cir 1987) (cited in note 1) (term-
ing a trial court approval of settlement as a "fait accompli"); Macey and Miller, 58 U Chi L
Rev at 46-47 (cited in note 1) (characterizing Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e) fair-
ness hearings as "pep rallies jointly orchestrated by plaintiffs' counsel and defense coun-
sel").
See, for example, Reynolds v Beneficial National Bank, 288 F3d 277, 284-85 (7th
Cir 2002) (overturning a settlement in a class action against tax preparer and bank re-
garding loans based upon income tax refunds because the court failed to give adequate
attention to determining the expected value to class if the case went to trial); Crawford,
201 F3d at 882 (reversing trial court approval of a settlement where class counsel and his
representative client "were paid handsomely to go away" and class members "received
nothing"). See also Scardelletti, 265 F3d at 215 (Michael concurring) (noting that in cir-
cuits allowing appeals by objectors who have not intervened, "we have not been presented
with any evidence that objector appeals have gummed up the works").
See 177 FRD 530 (1998) (adopting amended Rule 23(f) effective Dec 1, 1998).
See FRCP 23(f).
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class members."92 Some ability to screen the potential value of
objector input is even more critical in the wake of the Devlin deci-
sion.
In fact, there can be both positive and negative input from
class action objectors who comprise a diverse group of persons
and entities. The following parts of this Article focuses more spe-
cifically on these contrasting types of objector input and the judi-
cial attitude for sorting out the information offered by objectors.
II. EVALUATING PRIVATE OBJECTORS TO
CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENTS
While objections to a proposed class action settlement might
originate from public interest groups, the state or federal gov-
ernment, or court-appointed guardians ad litem representing ab-
sent class members or a particular subclass, input from such ob-
jectors is atypical in the normal hearing held under Rule 23(e) to
approve a proposed class settlement. Instead, the prototypical
class action objector is a private person or entity that is an absent
member of the designated class. That objector is represented by
an attorney who closely resembles the entrepreneurial counsel
who filed the class action. This Part evaluates the risks and bene-
fits of participation by the private objector and attorney to a class
action settlement.
A. Exploring the Problems Presented by Private Objectors: Ob-
jectors As Negative Inputs to Class Suits
The normal objector to a class action settlement is a disgrun-
tled absent member of the class, who comes forward to prevent a
trial court from approving a proposed class action settlement.
Alternatively, the objector may have filed a copycat class action-
a separate class action lawsuit, usually premised on exactly the
same theory as the initial suit and against the same defendant.
While in theory the objector is a monitor of the performance of
both the designated representative parties and counsel for the
class, a separate monitoring problem exists. The objector is
unlikely to be an acceptable monitor of the behavior of her own
attorney. This situation is analogous to the problems with the
principal-agent relationship between attorney and client at the
outset of a class action. In that context, a knowledgeable class
9 Rosenbaum, 64 F3d at 1442.
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action attorney, the principal, finds a member of the class, the
agent, and starts an uneasy attorney-client relationship that
makes client autonomy nearly impossible. 93
The class action objector process has an all too similar moni-
toring problem. The objector lacks the information to successfully
monitor the objector's attorney. In other words, the dilemma
arises regarding who is monitoring the monitor.94 In a small
stakes class action, the objector is the attorney, not the client,
and the attorney may go unmonitored.
One major reason behind the wholesale unpopularity of class
action objectors is their proclivity to free ride off of the efforts of
counsel who initiate the class action. Consider the situation of the
attorney who shows up seemingly out of nowhere, purporting to
represent a class member, in order to object to a settlement. This
attorney sits in the comfort of his office, reads about a proposed
class action settlement with an increasingly large amount of fi-
nancial information published by the press,95 finds a client, files
an objection to the proposed settlement, and, of course, requests
attorneys' fees in return for withdrawing objection to the possible
settlement. The conditions for free riding are optimal, where the
counsel for the objector has the incentive to object and the infor-
mation enabling the objection. In a context where the individual
class members have suffered small injuries, the objector mythol-
ogy holds that counsel for the objector merely free rides off of the
considerable investment of the initial class action attorney for
purely personal monetary gain.
This negative picture of the class action objection business
has sometimes been labeled extortion or blackmail. The counsel
for the objector agrees to allow the settlement to proceed, in ex-
" See, for example, Klement, 21 Rev Litig at 43-44 (cited in note 16) (arguing that
"class action attorneys are almost bound to appropriate part of class members' rightful
share, to work less than they should, and to give undue weight to their own welfare").
"' See, for example, Alchian and Demsetz, 62 Am Econ Rev at 781-82 (cited in note
10) (suggesting that shirking may be reduced by appointing someone to monitor team
production but then asking, "But who will monitor the monitor?").
' See, for example, Hensler, Class Action Dilemmas at 53 (cited in note 39) (setting
forth graph showing over 3200 stories in the general press about class actions and over
three hundred in the business press during 1995-96).
' See, for example, Diana B. Henriques, In Landmark Settlement, a Question of Fees,
NY Times Section 3 at 7 (Sept 13, 1998) (describing objectors to the settlement of an anti-
trust claim brought on a novel legal theory against multiple Wall Street brokerage houses
based upon alleged manipulation of the Nasdaq market and specifying that among objec-
tors was Berkeley, California lawyer Lawrence Schonbrun, "whose practice consists
largely of objecting to the fees sought by other lawyers in high-profile cases").
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change for a piece of the settlement pot.97 For example, the objec-
tor might threaten to file an appeal unless a proposed fee for
class counsel is decreased and the counsel for the objector is given
part of the reduced attorneys' fee.9
This alleged free riding goes beyond taking advantage of the
initial entrepreneurial investment decision of the first class coun-
sel who filed suit. The extortionist objecting attorney is also free
riding on the settlement negotiated by counsel for the class and
for the attorneys of the party opposing the class. The settlement
negotiation phase of a class action constitutes a major component
of the investment of both the plaintiff class and the defendant.
Negotiating and drafting a settlement and the time-consuming
process of explaining and selling it to clients requires consider-
able attorney time and labor. Objectors are free riding off of this
settlement effort as well as off of the original decisions to select a
defendant, identify a cause of action, and file suit.
Objectors can also have a negative impact on the cost of ad-
ministering a class action. The court has a limited amount of time
to devote to any particular task. The cost for a judge of dealing
with class action objectors can be considerable. Objectors can de-
lay the approval of a proposed settlement and the ultimate dis-
bursement of the remedy bargained for in the settlement negotia-
tion process. Such costs need to be factored into the overall calcu-
lus of sorting out the appropriate legal standards to govern objec-
tions to class actions.
The problem of so-called "canned" objections may be less
problematic than some believe. These objections are manufac-
tured in assembly-like fashion by extortionist counsel for objec-
tors, who churn out form-style objections without regard to the
actual facts of the case. To be sure, the fact that Justice Scalia
singled out the materials filed by the objectors in Shaw drew con-
See, for example, Patrick Woolley, 75 Tex L Rev at 618 (cited in note 28) (referring
to objectors who disrupt the settlement to obtain "a disproportionate amount of the set-
tlement fund"); Richard B. Schmitt, Legal Beat: Objecting to Class Action Pacts Can Be
Lucrative for Attorneys, Wall St J B1 (Jan 10, 1997) (quoting Professor Susan Koniak who
refers to objector participation as an extortion game); Advisory Committee Report at 183
(cited in note 8) (quoting testimony of Allen D. Black, Esq., that Committee Note should
point out directly that "an objection may have practical or 'blackmail' force beyond its
merits, if any").
" See, for example, Advisory Committee Report at 182-83 (cited in note 8) (quoting
Professor Charles Silver that "the standard extortionist [objector] tactic is to threaten to
appeal unless class counsel cuts the fee and to request a portion of the fee reduction as
compensation").
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siderable attention to the free riding problem.99 The clever treat-
ment of this point by the Shaw trial court surely caught the at-
tention of the Supreme Court.' District Judge Heartfield labeled
objections "canned" and referred to some of the attorneys repre-
senting those advancing the objections as "professional objectors"
who were appearing only to "extract a fee."' 0' While it is clear that
such objectors need to be chastised with the rhetoric used by
Judge Heartfield, lost in the rhetorical din was the court's conclu-
sion that the canned objections were "generic, unhelpful pro-
tests."'12 This statement is strikingly similar to those of courts
denying intervention to parties advancing only duplicative input
into a case."'
In the small stakes class action, there will be an unsatisfac-
tory stake or incentive for the absent class member to enter a
class action in order to voice an objection. As pointed out by Pro-
fessor Issacharoff, this is the very reason that the class action
monitoring problem exists.0 4 There is simply no reason to think
that the small stakes class member will possess either the infor-
mation or the incentive needed to evaluate the performance of
class counsel or, more specifically, the adequacy of a proposed
settlement.' °  Judge Posner put the matter succinctly by asserting
that "ordinarily the unnamed class members have individually
too little at stake to spend time monitoring the lawyer." 6
According to this line of reasoning, objectors present the po-
tential to "delay or disrupt a class settlement simply by interven-
ing and threatening to tie up the case on appeal."' 7 Objectors do
slow down the processing of a class action in a way that increases
91 F Supp 2d 942.
See Devlin, 536 US at 21 (Scalia dissenting) (citing Shaw as an example of the
ability of objectors to make litigation less efficient and stating that class action objectors
are undeterred in filing objections to a settlement and are similarly undeterred when
seeking to appeal).
"' Shaw, 91 F Supp 2d at 973-74.
' Id.
103 See text accompanying note 22.
104 Issacharoff, 1999 S Ct Rev at 371-72 (cited in note 11). Professor Issacharoff goes
on to argue that giving increasing voice to objectors will do little to provide the "structural
protections" needed to police class counsel decision making). Id at 372.
" See, for example, Christopher R. Leslie, A Market-Based Approach to Coupon Set-
tlements in Antitrust and Consumer Class Action Litigation, 49 UCLA L Rev 991, 1046-47
(2002) (explaining that "it is not cost-beneficial for any individual class member to invest
the time and resources necessary to effectively monitor the class counsel").
" Mars Steel v Continental Illinois National Bank and Trust Co, 834 F2d 627, 681
(7th Cir 1987).
"07 Issacharoff, 1999 S Ct Rev at 372 (cited in note 11).
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the parties' litigation costs. The ability to appeal after filing an
objection in the district court-now firmly established after Dev-
lin-slows down the class action's progress considerably. The
very threat of an appeal can give the attorneys representing ob-
jectors a major weapon. They now possess substantial leverage
when negotiating with the counsel seeking to secure an approved
settlement. In a very practical sense, Devlin may have raised the
ante for class action objectors by legitimizing their efforts to ap-
peal from district court approvals of settlements.
In addition to increasing the transaction costs of class action
litigation, counsel for the objectors will seek and may obtain at-
torneys' fees. The size of these fees can be considerable. °8 The
cost of compensating the class action objector may mean that less
is available for class members in what may be a limited settle-
ment pot. As aptly expressed by Professor Leslie, "[als too many
cooks spoil the broth, adding more attorneys depletes the settle-
ment pool.""9 Commentators have characterized the fees paid to
class action objecting attorneys as "an extortion game" 0 and
have described the objector's tactics as identifying a class action
settlement, arguing against it, and "go[ing] away" in exchange for
"some payment of attorneys' fees.""' One attorney who has filed
objections to class actions has conceded that objections to class
action settlements have "basically become a cottage industry.""'
" See Schmitt, Legal Beat, Wall St J 1 (cited in note 97) (describing the objection
process as motivated by fees to the counsel representing objectors and describing "big
payoffs" to counsel for objectors, including $1.45 million to a Dallas firm for six weeks of
work, one million dollars to objectors who opposed the Louisiana-Pacific Corp siding set-
tlement, and a proposed fee of $875,000 to lawyers for objectors challenging the then pend-
ing coupon settlement in the General Motors pickup truck litigation).
10 Leslie, 49 UCLA L Rev at 1047, n 293 (cited in note 105).
11 Schmitt, Objecting to Class Action Pacts, Wall St J at B1 (cited in note 108) (quot-
ing Professor Susan Koniak).
.. David Lyons, Flight Attendants' Lawyers Object to Settlement, Miami Herald 1B
(June 29, 1998) (quoting Professor John Banzhaff III, who also noted, "I have never heard
of these folks .... [they have had no concern about the whole thing is over, and they [ob-
jectors] suddenly come in, I would say is suspicious"). See also Advisory Committee Report
at 233 (cited in note 8) (quoting Professor Charles Silver that "[flee objections are point-
less .... their only purpose is to enrich strategic objectors who threaten to 'hold up' set-
tlements by appealing unless they are paid to disappear").
112 Schmitt, Objecting to Class-Action Pacts, Wall St J at B2 (cited in note 108) (quot-
ing Chicago attorney Alexander Moore). See also Henriques, Landmark Settlement, NY
Times at 7 (cited in note 96) (referring to an attorney whose practice consists largely of
filing objections to class action settlement fees sought by class counsel); text accompanying
note 155 (discussing the full time objector practice of attorney Lawrence Schonbrun);
Hensler, Class Action Dilemmas at 90 (cited in note 39) (summarizing interviews that
view objectors as plaintiff's attorneys who have filed either objections or duplicative class
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The payoff of objectors in the class action suit brought
against Louisiana-Pacific Corporation illustrates this extortion
game.113 This case involved allegations that class members had
been injured by the deterioration of the defendant's Inner Seal
siding."4 Objectors emerged after the class counsel had negotiated
a $375 million settlement."5 After a mediator recommended that
the objectors' counsel receive a $400,000 fee, objectors filed an
appeal of the court's overall settlement, arguing that the twenty-
five million dollar fee to class counsel was excessive."6 The objec-
tors withdrew their appeal in return for an increased fee of one
million dollars, and the trial court defended the result by reason-
ing that "it was better to get finality than to hold the [settlement]
up any further.""' 7
The case of the unknowing objector, Vollmer v Publishers
Clearing House,"8 represents a good example of judicial distaste
for class action objectors. There, the appellate court remanded a
trial court Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 ("Rule 11") sanction
of fifty thousand dollars against counsel for a class action objec-
tor,"9 but voiced considerable displeasure with the two attorneys
who had moved to intervene and objected to an already negoti-
ated settlement.2 ° Questions by the district court to the objecting
client "demonstrated great unfamiliarity with the nature of his
complaint," showed utter lack of knowledge about the terms of
the proposed settlement that was the subject of his attack, and
revealed that the objector was the spouse of the office manager
for one of his two attorneys. 2' In response, the trial court stated
that the counsel for objectors appeared to be seeking to delay the
actions in other jurisdictions or threatened to either object or file a copycat class suit in an
effort to seek a share of the fees already negotiated by class counsel).
... See Staff, Court Clears Accord in Louisiana-Pacific Class Action Lawsuit, Wall St J




.. Schmitt, Objecting to Class-Action Pacts, Wall St J at B16 (cited in note 110) (quot-
ing United States District Judge Robert E. Jones, who added that he thought the ultimate
fee awarded to objectors was reasonable). For criticism of the initial twenty-six million
dollar payout to class counsel in the case, see Richard B. Schmitt, Class Action? Louisi-
ana-Pacific Cut a Quick Deal to Avert Homeowner Lawsuits, Wall St J Al, A6 (July 24,
1998) (reporting that the amount sought by class counsel was far too low, that plaintiff's
counsel did little discovery, and that the company defendant sought a quick settlement to
avoid larger liability).
"' 248 F3d 698 (7th Cir 2001).
... Id at 701
,"0 Id at 709.
... Id at 703-05.
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case and increase its costs.22 The court issued a show cause order,
demanding reasons why the two attorneys representing the un-
knowing objector should not be found in violation of Rule 11.123
Although the Vollmer decision overturned the trial judge's sanc-
tion order for procedural reasons, 124 it quoted extensively from the
trial court's condemnation of the behavior of counsel for the un-
knowing objector. The circuit court concluded that the district
court was correct to deny the objector's intervention because the
motion to intervene was an attempt to gain discovery rather than
to preserve a right to appeal. 2 '
Perhaps the biggest single drawback to the objection process
is the reduced incentive it gives to counsel to initiate class actions
in the first place. 126 The decision to bring a class action is an in-
vestment decision by the entrepreneurial attorney for the class. 27
While it may be argued that class actions are far too easy to file,
in fact, substantial sums can be spent investigating the decision
to file a class suit. These pre-suit expenditures by potential coun-
Vollmer, 248 F3d at 707.
1 Id at 709.
The Rule 11 sanctions were said to be improper because of the size of the sanction
and because the trial court had used information he personally gathered about the prac-
tice experience and reputation of the two attorneys sanctioned without placing such mate-
rial on the record. Among other things, this research convinced the trial judge that one or
both of the sanctioned attorneys were professional objectors. Id at 709-10. Such contacts
were said to threaten counsel's due process rights. Id at 710, citing Simer v Rios, 661 F2d
655, 680-81 (7th Cir 1981).
Vollmer at 705-07.
26 This criticism assumes that there is value in the class action device: See, for exam-
ple, Dam, 4 J Legal Stud at 48-49 (cited in note 9) (stressing the aggregative efficiency
potential of class actions, their ability to deter wrongful conduct, and their ability to com-
pensate victims). The class action is part of the American private attorney general scheme
of law enforcement that leaves the bulk of law enforcement in the hands of the free mar-
ket, rather than allocate to the state the task of initiating suits. Without an efficient
means to bring suits, laws-including legislation-are not likely to be followed. The
United States has correctly chosen to leave to the market the task of selecting most law-
suits, including class actions. Consider Brunet, 74 Tulane L Rev at 1928 (cited in note 32)
(arguing that the "American law enforcement scheme [is] dominated by private attorney
general enforcement" and that cheap, efficient means of enforcing substantive law are
essential if laws are to be obeyed); Edward Brunet, Measuring the Costs of Civil Justice,
83 Mich L Rev 916, 932 (1985) (contending that litigation is a public good). An alternative
system, which leaves civil law enforcement to the state, would require great expenditures
of public funds and leave most case selection in the hands of government. See Hensler,
Class Action Dilemmas at 69 (cited in note 39) (asserting that "public agencies lack suffi-
cient financial resources to monitor and detect all wrongdoing or to prosecute all legal
violations").
.2. See, for example, Richard A. Epstein, Class Actions: The Need for a Hard Second
Look, 4 Civil Justice Report at 1 (March 2002) (describing "entrepreneurial lawyers who
hope to profit by organizing a class of potential plaintiffs and bringing their joint claim to
a successful conclusion").
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sel for a plaintiff class are risky investments.1 28 The up-front in-
vestment costs involve both a factual and a legal component.' 29 In
theory, the ability of third-party counsel to easily free ride off the
initiation of class actions by the real entrepreneurs, the initial
class counsel, would deter the filing of class actions below the op-
timal level of law enforcement. An attorney who considers filing a
class action may be deterred from initiating suit because of a fear
of objector free riding. In fact, it is very difficult, if not impossible,
to know if the filing of class actions has been deterred below what
may be an appropriate level.
The alleged extortion ploy of the attorney for objectors-
seeking a fee from the already negotiated settlement pot as a
form of payment for withdrawing the objection or not appealing-
merits attention. It might be reasonably argued that such extor-
tionist payments are counterproductive to the original settlement
agreement. Defendant's counsel, knowing that objectors are likely
to subsequently emerge demanding a form of attorneys' fees as
tribute from the settlement pot, may withhold consideration
when negotiating the settlement of the class action.' ° Presuma-
bly, this negotiation tactic would be based on the defendant's as-
sumption that class counsel will want to increase the amount of
an already negotiated settlement to pay the tribute to the objec-
tor's attorney without decreasing the size of the proposed fee
award to class counsel.
While such a scenario is possible, negotiation dynamics make
it unlikely to occur very often. After the Devlin decision, it be-
came clear that objectors are players in class action settlements.
Counsel for the class, knowing that one or more objectors are
likely to emerge, has the incentive to try to increase a settlement
demand to include an incremental part of the settlement for
likely objectors. In a sense, the prospect of subsequent objections
and the need to pay for them has been bid into the dynamic nego-
tiation process and accounted for by the parties.' While it is true
" See Schmitt, Objecting to Class-Action Pact, Wall St J at B16 (cited in note 110)
(quoting Professor Charles Silver who argues that "if you are not out in the forefront bear-
ing the costs and risks of litigation, you should be viewed with suspicion").
IV See, for example, FRCP 11(b) (requiring the pleader to have good ground to support
both the factual and legal foundation of a lawsuit).
" See, for example, Advisory Committee Report at 182-83 (cited in note 8) (summa-
rizing the comments of Professor Charles Silver arguing that to allow objector attorneys'
fees to come out of the original settlement pot "is dangerous because it will lead defen-
dants to hold back in the initial settlement agreement").
131 See, for example, Edward Brunet and Charles B. Craver, Alternative Dispute Reso-
lution: The Advocate's Perspective 82-85 (Bender 2d ed 2001) (noting that the rational
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that defendants will attempt to avoid these fees, counsel for the
plaintiff will exert pressure to include them in the original set-
tlement. In approving an award of attorneys' fees to counsel for
an objector, one district judge observed, "[nlo doubt settlement
amounts are often negotiated, both in individual cases and class
actions, with this prospect in mind."'32 Accordingly, it remains
unclear whether the process of paying fees, even to an extortion-
ist objector, will necessarily effect the amount negotiated as a
settlement for the class or not.
The perception that objectors are now legally enshrined as
potentially legitimate players in the class action settlement game
may have been solidified by the proposed changes to Rule 23.
Proposed Rule 23(h)(3), entitled "Objections to Motion" and deal-
ing with the award of attorneys' fees in class actions, now con-
firms that "[a] class member, or a party from whom payment is
sought, may object to the motion."133 The Committee Note accom-
panying the proposed addition to Rule 23 signals that this provi-
sion "may be a basis for making an [attorney's feel award to other
counsel whose work produced a beneficial result for the class,
such as . .. attorneys who represented objectors to a proposed
settlement under Rule 23(e) or to the fee motion of class coun-
sel."134 The overall impact of the proposed textual change and
comment is to give the trial court discretion to award attorneys'
fees to the objector's counsel.
The Committee Note accompanying proposed Rule 23(h) even
raises the possibility of discovery by objectors, specifying that the
"court may allow an objector discovery relevant to the objec-
tions."'36 The Sixth Circuit has left open the possibility of objector
negotiator will base offers and bottom line upon information possessed at time of negotia-
tion).
3' Duhaime v John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co, 2 F Supp 2d 175, 176 (D Mass
1998). See Scardelletti, 265 F3d at 215 (Michael concurring) (noting that "When everyone
involved-the class representatives, the defendants, the lawyers, and even the trial
judge-knows that an objector has the right to appeal, it stands to reason that a settle-
ment proposal will be designed and scrutinized with more care").
Advisory Committee Report at 116 (cited in note 8).
'" Id at 117. This position was taken individually by the Reporter to the Civil Rules
Committee. See Edward H. Cooper, The (Cloudy) Future of Class Actions, 40 Ariz L Rev
923, 950 (1998) (asserting that "[m]eans should be found to ensure that the costs of object-
ing are awarded on terms that will encourage reasonable objections").
'" See text accompanying notes 165, 178, and 258 (discussing whether objectors are
entitled to attorneys' fees under present doctrine).
"w Id at 121. See Edward H. Cooper, 40 Ariz L Rev at 950 (cited in note 134) (asserting
that class action objectors should be granted "full (and guided)" discovery on the merits of
the litigation and also on the process of negotiating a proposed settlement).
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discovery to determine the reasonableness of attorneys' fees.1 37
The First Circuit has taken a contrary position: that an objector
has no right to either discovery or to court scrutiny of an alleg-
edly extortionist payoff to a separate set of objectors.138 Several
commentators have criticized the permissive Committee Note
language as facilitating extortion by class action objectors, since
it enables them to seek separate settlement fees by using discov-
ery as a weapon. 139 Such criticism assumes that the discovery re-
quests would be illegitimate, made only to generate fees. 4 ° Others
have criticized objector discovery because it adds cost and delay
to the administration of class actions.1
4 1
When the discretionary text of the proposed rule is viewed in
conjunction with the permissive accompanying commentary, the
potential for abuses of discovery becomes clear. To compensate for
this possibility, rational, experienced negotiators will incorporate
this into the initial negotiation process. My point is not that ei-
ther party would welcome objector discovery-they will surely
oppose it.'42 Yet, the parties will be thinking about objectors and
possible objector discovery requests when negotiating a settle-
ment, and surely will incorporate this certainty into the dynamic
negotiating process.
13 See Bowling v Pfizer, Inc, 102 F3d 777, 780-81 (6th Cir 1996) (noting that side
agreements between class counsel and objectors raise questions that make such agree-
ments relevant, but denying the discovery request advanced by intervenor-objectors where
settlement had become final).
38 See Duhaime, 183 F3d at 4 (holding that an objector has no right to discovery or
court review of side settlement when there is no demonstration of fraud involving the
settlement approved for the class). For criticism of the First Circuit position, see, for ex-
ample, Ikeda, Note, 15 Georgetown J Legal Ethics at 191-93 (cited in note 17) (arguing
that the side settlement in this litigation necessarily affected the basic settlement of the
case itself, and thereby merited careful judicial review).
13 See, for example, Advisory Committee Report at 179-83 (cited in note 8) (summa-
rizing comments by (1) David E. Romaine, Esq., that allowing more objector discovery is
troubling and unwise because "greater objector discovery would only increase costs and
delay;" (2) John Beisner, Esq., that allowing objector discovery may be used to "secure
unwarranted leverage by counsel or certain class members for personal benefit"; (3) Pro-
fessor Charles Silver that a class member with a small claim who demands to see exten-
sive discovery documents and depose everyone "is acting irrationally and probably is an
extortion artist").
-81 Id.
141 See, for example, id at 184-85 (summarizing statements of (1) NASCAT and Com-
mittee to Support the Antitrust Laws that "routine access to discovery in the class action
may impose cost and delay, particularly in complex cases with hundreds of thousands of
pages of documents" and (2) Steven P. Gregory, Esq., "that [o]bjections, even frivolous
objections, can cause unnecessary delay in awarding benefits to class members" and sug-
gesting that a "compelling reason" be presented to justify objector discovery).
141 See, for example, id at 183-84 (cited in note 8) (summarizing statement of Beverly
C. Moore, Jr., Esq., that "[elven plaintiffs' counsel object to objector discovery").
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B. Viewing Objectors in a More Positive Light: Objectors as a
Potential Benefit To Class Actions
Class action mythology consists nearly exclusively of nega-
tive observations about objectors. The previous Subpart depicts
the prevailing view. Unfortunately, the prevailing view ignores
the potential that objectors can be a helpful force for the class.
This Part examines a number of potential benefits that private
objectors may bring to the class action context.
I begin on an important quantitative note. It is important to
determine whether there is really a class action culture of regu-
lar, routine objector free riding, and also whether there is a sub-
set of objectors who are genuine repeat-player "professional objec-
tors." We simply do not know how frequently objectors attempt to
participate in class actions. In the mythological class action, there
is always one or more free-riding objector's attorney, whose prac-
tice consists of seeking to manipulate his or her client while
threatening to object to a proposed class action settlement.14 3
However, the only Federal Judicial Center ("FJC") study of class
actions found that a significant percentage of class action settle-
ments were approved by the district courts with no objection
whatsoever.14 ' The percentage of class action cases in which no
objections to a proposed settlement were filed, either in writing or
in person, ranged from a high of 64 percent in the Southern Dis-
trict of Florida to a low of 42 percent in the Northern District of
Illinois.' 5 While this valuable study appears to be the only reli-
able measure of the extent of objector participation, it is, of
course, an incomplete snapshot of objector participation in class
actions. It is fascinating, however, to think that the mythology of
,' See, for example, Thomas E. Willging, Laurel L. Hooper, and J. Niemic, Empirical
Study of Class Actions in Four Federal District Courts: Final Report of the Advisory Com-
mittee on Civil Rules 178, 183 (Fed Jud Center 1996) (referring to a "growing" and "entre-
premeurial" use of objections by professional objectors).
.. See id (setting forth data on class actions terminated in the two year period be-
tween July 1, 1992 and June 30, 1994, in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, the South-
ern District of Florida, the Northern District of Illinois, and the Northern District of Cali-
fornia). Other studies of class action data do not cover participation by objectors. See
Hensler, Class Action Dilemmas at 460-61 (cited in note 39); Bruce I. Bertelsen, Mary S.
Calfee, and Gerald W. Connor, Note, The Rule 23(b)(3) Class Action: An Empirical Study,
62 Georgetown L J 1123, 1154-56 (1974).
"' The other two district courts reported no objector participation at 51 percent (ED
Pa) and 60 percent (ND Cal). Willging, Hooper, and Niemic, Empirical Study at 178 (cited
in note 143). These results, of course, closely mirror the non-objector participation of the
other two districts mentioned in the text.
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an "investor in every proposed settlement pot" seems to be false,
at least from this one study.
The data studied by the FJC were even more striking with
regard to the percentage of class action settlement hearings at
which objectors appeared. One would anticipate that a free-riding
objector and her attorney would appear and present their views
at the Rule 23(e) hearing in order to make an impression with the
court and, for settlement leverage purposes, with both class coun-
sel and attorneys for the party defending against the class. In-
stead, the FJC study found that objector participation in the set-
tlement approval hearings ranged from a high of 14 percent to a
low of 7 percent.'46 In other words, the typical class action settle-
ment hearing is one in which the class action objector does not
participate. This point did not go unnoticed by the Judicial Con-
ference when it submitted comments to the proposed recent
changes to Rule 23, as the Conference emphasized the very low
level of objector participation in the class action data available for
study. 147
In theory, this low rate of objector participation at class ac-
tion settlement hearings could reflect an "early side deal" strat-
egy. In other words, a "lie in the weeds" objection strategy might
be consistent with an opportunistic view of the behavior of objec-
tor's counsel, who might conceivably try to sell the objector's lack
of participation at a Rule 23(e) hearing as part of an early side
deal, whereby an objector agrees to withdraw a potential formal
objection in return for a handsome fee. This view is consistent
with the free-riding view of private professional objectors' coun-
sel, who may be trying to reap a sell-out settlement to enrich
himself while doing as little real work as possible.
Yet, there are two reasons to question whether the low rate
of objector participation supports the existence of early side deals.
First, a class action objector's attorney who wanted to maximize
his fee would be prone to object loudly at the Rule 23 hearing it-
self. That is the only way to fully express the grounds for objec-
tion to the trial court. An objector who strikes an early side deal
may not be maximizing revenue. Second, the low measure of ob-
jector participation at the Rule 23(e) fairness hearing might re-
'46 Id at 139. The other two districts reported objector participation at Rule 23(e) hear-
ings at 11 percent and 9 percent. Id.
"' Advisory Committee Report at 165 (cited in note 8) (summarizing input from the
Conference that the FJC study "showed that 90 percent of settlements reviewed were
approved without objections and without change").
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flect the way the FJC counted "objections." Any class member
who wrote a letter to the court questioning the adequacy of a pro-
posed settlement or voicing general concerns was included as a
class action objector for the purposes of the 42 percent to 64 per-
cent of class actions that included "objectors."148 This number nec-
essarily includes a large number of unrepresented pro se objec-
tors who merely write one letter and then disappear from the liti-
gation process.49 Classifying such absentees as objectors over-
states the quantum of attorney-led free-riding objection activity,
which in reality is probably a low percentage of all class action
objections.
It is even more difficult to know whether there are so-called
"professional objectors" 15-attorneys who make a living free rid-
ing off the work of class counsel. The testimony submitted to the
Civil Rules Advisory Committee relating to the proposed change
to Rule 23 seems contradictory. The Association of the Bar of the
City of New York opposed making discovery available to class
action objectors because "there is a growing entrepreneurial use
of objections by professional objectors."'51 This mirrors the view
that class action objecting has become a "cottage industry""' and
the position taken in Shaw, lamenting canned objections that had
apparently been filed by "professional objectors.""' 3
Recent comments to the Civil Rules Advisory Committee by
Washington, D.C. attorney Brian Wolfman flatly refute the idea
of a culture of free-riding professional objectors. Mr. Wolfman
' Telephone interview with Thomas Willging, Federal Judicial Center, Oct 28, 2002
(author of FJC Report of class actions in four districts confirming that FJC counted pro se
letters to the court as objector activity and that such letters comprise a significant quan-
tity of objection activity); Willging, Hooper, and Niemic, Empirical Study at 178 (cited in
note 143).
"' Telephone interview with Thomas Willging of the Federal Judicial Center, Oct. 4,
2002.
" I define "professional objectors" in the normal sense of the term to be attorneys in
private practice who have a specialty in filing objections in class action cases, usually after
a proposed settlement has emerged, and always to collect a fee. I exclude attorneys who
sometimes are repeat players in the class action business who work for state attorneys
general offices or public interest groups. The latter are unlikely to be extortionists and
particularly unlikely to withdraw an objection in exchange for a privately negotiated fee.
"' Willging, Hooper, and Niemic, Empirical Study at 183 (cited in note 143) (attaching
a Sept 19, 2000 letter opposing a draft rule that would make discovery available to objec-
tors).
"' See Schmitt, Objecting to Class-Action Pacts, Wall St J at B1 (cited in note 110)
(quoting Chicago attorney Alexander Moore that objecting has "become basically a cottage
industry" and elaborating that "law firms are making a living doing nothing more than
objecting to class action settlements").
" 91 F Supp 2d at 973.
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specializes in filing class action objections on behalf of absent
class members, in conjunction with the public interest group Pub-
lic Citizen."' He claims to know only one professional objector,
and notes and that this attorney has made meritorious objections
in many cases. 5' My point is not to assess whether Mr. Wolfman
" See text accompanying notes 238, 250, and 266; <http://www.citizen.
org/printerarticle.cfm?ID=552> (visited Apr 7, 2002) (summarizing over thirty leading
class actions in which Public Citizen has presented objections to class action settlements).
See also Brian Wolfman, Forward: The National Association of Consumer Advocates' Stan-
dards and Guidelines for Litigating and Settling Class Actions, 176 FRD 370 (1998) (stat-
ing that Mr. Wolfman is a staff lawyer for the Public Citizen Litigation Group who 'fre-
quently represents objectors to class action settlements"). In a literal sense, the attorneys
who routinely represent class action objectors on behalf of public interest groups such as
Public Citizen or Trial Lawyers for Public Justice's Class Action Abuse Project are the
true professional objectors. See text accompanying note 151.
" Mr. Wolfman reveals the identity of this professional objector as Lawrence Schon-
brun of Berkeley, California. Telephone interview with Brian Wolfman, Sept 27, 2002.
This revelation comes as no surprise given the amount of press that surrounds Mr. Schon-
brun. Mr. Schonbrun describes himself as a "nationally recognized authority on the issue
of attorney's fees in class actions [who has] appeared on '60 Minutes,' '20/20'. . . [and] has
been chronicled in the Wall Street Journal, Barron's, and the Washington Post." Lawrence
W. Schonbrun, The Class Action Con Game, 20 Regulation (cited in note 21). A Wall Street
Journal reporter wrote that Schonbrun has "objected to numerous class action settlements
over the years, usually without pay," but noted that he was paid $100,000 for objecting to
the settlement of a class action against Louisiana-Pacific corporation. Schmitt, Objecting
to Class-Action Pacts, Wall St J at B1 (cited in note 108). See also Hensler, Class Action
Dilemmas at 360 (cited in note 39) (noting that Mr. Schonbrun represented objectors in
the Louisiana-Pacific class action and that he was paid $100,000 not from the settlement
common fund but from class counsel and the defendant). A New York Times reporter has
described Mr. Schonbrun's practice as consisting "largely of objecting to the fees sought by
other lawyers in high-profile cases" in a story about objectors' challenges to a proposed
$174,823,124 fee in an antitrust class action against multiple Wall Street brokerage
houses. See Henriques, Landmark Settlement, NY Times at 7 (cited in note 96). A Na-
tional Law Journal reporter described Mr. Schonbrun as a "sole practitioner [who] devotes
most of his practice to objecting to class settlements and attorney fees" and applying to the
court for fees in return for his objections. Van Voris, Plaintiff Bar Divided, Natl L J at A22
(cited in note 33). A Miami Herald writer quoting Mr. Schonbrun in 1998 reported that he
had "filed objections in 70 cases around the country." Lyons, Flight Attendants' Lawyers
Object to Settlement, Miami Herald at 1B (cited in note 111). Schonbrun's work as an
objector has not gone without controversy. In the Shaw decision, a separate segment of
the court's opinion approving settlement dealt with Mr. Schonbrun's objection on behalf of
his client Robert Demyanovich. Shaw, 91 F Supp 2d 75. The court was clearly upset that
Schonbrun, who had submitted a declaration that included six pages of media articles
setting forth his prior work challenging attorneys' fees in proposed class action settle-
ments, was unable to provide his client's correct address, telephone number, or the serial
number for a Toshiba laptop purchased by his stated client. Id. The court revoked its prior
order granting Mr. Schonbrun pro hac vice status and entered an order that he would
have to submit a motion for such status one week before his next appearance in the East-
ern District of Texas including a verified affidavit containing specific details about his
alleged client's identity. Id. See also Mike Carter, Permatemp Lawyers Get $27 Million,
Seattle Times B2 (May 16, 2002) (reporting the settlement of an employment law class
action against Microsoft in which Schonbrun represented objectors to a proposed twenty-
seven million dollar fee award and quoting Judge John Coughenour that Mr. Schonbrun's
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is correct, but to raise the question of whether there is any firm
proof of systematic extortionist free riding by class action objec-
tors. To be sure, there are a few reported cases discussing other
repeat-player attorneys who represent objectors.156 It appears that
there is a split of non-empirical authority on this controversy.
Objectors can be an important source of unique input into the
class action.57 This is particularly true of objections to proposed
settlements, where the attorneys who have negotiated the set-
tlement have no incentive to criticize their own agreement,' and
the court may just want to excise a complex case from its
docket.5 ' The true professional extortionist free-riding objector
would object purely to obtain "blackmail, ""O and is likely to ad-
vance informational input of little value in assessing the validity
of the class action settlement. In contrast, it is possible that a
legitimately interested objector could emerge with important
facts that shed new light on a putative settlement.
Several courts have explicitly praised class action objectors.
In Reynolds v Beneficial National Bank, 6' the Seventh Circuit
conduct was "questionable"). Mr. Schonbrun achieved a noteworthy victory for his objector
client in Powers v Eichen, 229 F3d 1249, 1256 (9th Cir 2000). There, the Ninth Circuit
held that trial court class action fee awards must clearly set out the reasons supporting a
fee above a 25 percent "benchmark." Id. See also Staff, In Brief Objectors Win, Natl L J
A12 (Nov 6, 2000) (describing Mr. Schonbrun's result in Powers); Lawrence W. Schonbrun,
Tobacco Lawyers: Settlement's Biggest Winners, available at <http://www.reporter-
news.com/opinion97/con092297.html> (visited Apr 7, 2003) (op-ed by Mr. Schonbrun ex-
plaining that the class action plaintiff's bar will select an industry, file a class action, and
harm consumers, and characterizing the American legal system as the "world's largest
lottery").
1" See, for example, Vollmer, 248 F3d at 709-10 (reversing fifty thousand dollar Rule
11 sanction against California attorneys described as "not real class action lawyers," but
instead, lawyers who "follow people around the country.., and then they stick their nose
in [a case] and they extract money").
157 See Willging, Hooper, and Niemic, Empirical Study at 58 (cited in note 143) (con-
cluding that "objections represent an outside source of information about the substance of
the settlement" and that such objections may be "a crucial source of information about
defects in the settlement").
" Id (acknowledging that "the settling parties at this stage have little or no incentive
to present negative information about the settlement").
159 See, for example, In re Prudential Insurance Co America Sales Practice Litigation
Agent Actions, 278 F3d 175, 202 (3d Cir 2002) (asserting that "[e]ven the court at this
point may be inclined to favor settlement of a huge, complex action, and the general at-
mosphere becomes highly cooperative"); Bainbridge and Gulati, How Do Judges Maxi-
mize?, 51 Emory L J at 139-40 (cited in note 15) (contending that judges are boundedly
rational and that they lack the incentive to dig deeply into issues in complex, technical
cases); Coffee and Koniak, Latest Class Action Scam, Wall St J at All (cited note 15)
(asserting that judges lack the incentives "to resist parties who want to settle" and also
lack the information to know when a proposed settlement is really collusive).
" See text accompanying note 97.
11 288 F3d 277 (7th Cir 2002).
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accepted the arguments of objectors challenging a settlement be-
tween class counsel and defendants.'62 The class consisted of re-
cipients of allegedly illegal income tax refund anticipation loans,
and they sought to bring claims against a tax preparer and a
lending bank. Judge Posner overturned the trial court's approval
of a settlement, praising objectors and their lawyers in the proc-
ess."'63 Judge Posner characterized the objectors as "in effect vol-
unteer lawyers for the class" who constitute a "real party in in-
terest."'64 He also approved the concept of awarding a fee to ob-
jecting counsel because "[iut is desirable to have as broad a range
of participants in the fairness hearing as possible because of the
risk of collusion over attorneys' fees and the terms of settlement
generally." '65
Judge Easterbrook has also taken a position justifying objec-
tors on instrumental grounds. In Crawford, the Seventh Circuit
reversed district court approval of a class action settlement in a
case brought under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.166
Judge Easterbrook's opinion endorsed broadly permitting objector
intervention and objection, asserting that trial courts should
"freely allow the intervention of unnamed class members who
object to proposed settlements."'67 The Third Circuit has mirrored
this view, concluding that "objectors play an important role by
giving courts access to information on the settlement's merits" in
a context in which class and defense counsel "can be expected to
... Id at 282-83.
" Judge Posner specifically criticized the trial court for approving the settlement
without considering evidence of the "net expected value of continued litigation to the class,
since a settlement for less than that value would not be adequate." Reynolds, 288 F3d at
284-85.
Id at 287-88.
Id at 288. While endorsing the possibility of a fee paid to an objector's attorney,
Judge Posner went on to limit the objector's fee to situations where the enhanced value to
the settlement was greater than the fee sought and to observe that the instant objector
may not deserve a fee because of an earlier similar objection by a different objector group.
Id at 288-89. This conclusion was couched in restitution terms, that objectors, while "good
Samaritans," constitute "professionals [who] render valuable albeit not bargained-for
services in circumstances in which high transaction costs prevent negotiation and volun-
tary agreement." Reynolds, 288 F3d at 288 (citing Saul Levmore, Explaining Restitution,
71 Va L Rev 65 (1985)). See also Duhaime v John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co, 2 F
Supp 2d 175, 176 (D Mass 1998) (approving a $59,211.56 award of attorneys' fees to class
action objector and former Senator Howard Metzenbaum because "his attorneys' work did
substantially benefit the class generally" by improving the information contained in the
class notice involving options available to absentees and by reducing the attorneys' fees to
class counsel).
" 15 USC § 1692e (2000).
.. Crawford, 201 F3d at 881.
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spotlight the proposal's strengths and slight its defects.""8 Judge
Rosenn, also of the Third Circuit, expressed a similar attitude by
asserting that "a lawyer with objector status plays a highly im-
portant role for the class and the court because he or she raises
challenges free from the burden of conflicting baggage that Class
Counsel carries. " "' While these positions stop short of a complete
theoretical justification of the routine objector voice in class ac-
tion litigation, they find potential value in receiving objector in-
put.1
70
Other decisions specifically note the value of objector partici-
pation in the context of a case. In In re Telectronics Pacing Sys-
tems, Inc,171 the Seventh Circuit overturned a district court order
approving a class action settlement in a products liability action
against makers of allegedly defective leads to cardiac pacemak-
ers.'72 Largely relying on the arguments advanced by the objec-
tors, but rejected by the trial judge, the court found the settle-
ment lacking proof of an arms-length negotiation.173 The Third
Circuit referred to "enhancements" by objector representatives of
four states to a proposed settlement of an insurance fraud class
action brought by the Milberg, Weiss firm.' A district judge or-
ganized his rationale approving a class action settlement against
Toshiba for allegedly marketing defective laptop computers by
designating a segment of his opinion "Beneficial Objectors" and
" Bell Atlantic Corp v Bolger, 2 F3d 1304, 1310 (3d Cir 1993) (noting that in "seeking
court approval of their settlement proposal, plaintiffs' attorneys' and defendants' interests
coalesce and mutual interest may result in mutual indulgence").
"' Prudential Insurance, 278 F3d at 202 (Rosenn concurring and dissenting) (noting
also that the "objecting lawyer independently can monitor the proposed settlement" and
that the objecting lawyer "not only renders a service to the class, but aids the court").
"o For the position that there is a healthy reversal rate in the appeals filed by objec-
tors that demonstrates the value of the objection process, see Brief of Amicus Curiae,
Council of Institutional Investors in Support of Petitioner, Devlin v Scardelletti, No 01-
417, 2001 US Briefs 417 at 18 (noting that there were forty-four published appeals by
objectors between 1971-2000 and fourteen-32 percent-resulted in reversals, compared
to overall reversal rate for federal civil appeals in 2000 of 12 percent).
171 221 F3d 870, 882 (6th Cir 2000).
171 Id at 875.
"' Id at 880 (asserting that the appellate court "cannot approve this settlement be-
cause it appears not to be the result of arms-length negotiation among the parties" and
rejecting the contention that the threat of bankruptcy justifies a limited fund class action).
See also Powers v Eichen, 229 F3d 1249, 1255-56 (9th Cir 2000) (permitting an appeal by
objectors of an order approving attorneys' fees because of the conceptual difficulty of the
lawyer for the class negotiating his own fee and the inadequacy of the notice which con-
tained little information regarding fees).
' See Prudential Insurance, 148 F3d at 298 (reversing, in part, the trial court's ap-
proval of a settlement and requiring clarification of a fee award and noting that the state
objectors improved mathematical scoring procedure for filing claims by class members).
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noting that the input of some objectors led to substantially ex-
tending the redemption date for coupons, and thereby increasing
the potential value of the settlement.17 Similarly, a trial court
praised the "active participation of several [objector] fee appli-
cants" who had "enhanced" the district judge's settlement evalua-
tion of both the class counsel's attorneys' fees and the proof re-
quirements for absent class members seeking to claim settlement
funds, while at the same time denying any objectors' fee to an
applicant who had "neither benefited the class nor assisted the
Court.
,176
Analysis of decisions involving objectors who enhance a
common settlement fund underscores a distinction between two
types of objectors. Objectors who are trying to enrich a settlement
fund are not necessarily in the same position as objectors who
seek to decrease attorneys' fees. Their objectives and impact are
distinguishable. Fee objectors serve a useful purpose to the court,
but also simultaneously act as unappointed agents for the class
action defendant, often raising arguments that the size of the fee
is too high in relation to the quality of the substantive plaintiffs'
case.' In addition, objectors to fees alone might be sometimes
willing to extort their own side deal and readily depart the scene.
In contrast, the objector who seeks to enhance a settlement pool
seems to advance the interest of the class members more clearly.
It may also be important to distinguish between proposed
monetary settlements with a single, undefined settlement fund,
from which both attorneys' fees and class compensation are
taken, and a proposed settlement that separates attorneys' fees
from funds for the class. The fee objector in the former case is
really enhancing the compensation to the class if he successfully
reduces fees. In contrast, the fee objector in the latter case is only
reducing the amount owed by the class action defendant. For that
.7 See Shaw, 91 F Supp 2d at 973-75 (noting that objector's counsel had doubled the
length of time to redeem coupons and thereby "conferred a substantial benefit on the
class," but also observing that other objectors had filed "canned" objections having nothing
to do with the case and another objector's attorney, Lawrence Schonbrun, had "submitted
documents to this Court which are, at best, negligently created and, at worst, suspiciously
manufactured").
171 In re Domestic Air Transportation Antitrust Litigation, 148 FRD 297, 359-60 (N D
Ga 1993).
... While it is true that some class action defendants will be indifferent as to the size of
the plaintiffs' attorneys' fees in a proposed class action settlement, defendants cannot help
but be pleased when an objector argues that the fee is too high given the poor quality of
the plaintiffs' arguments.
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reason, this objector might be characterized as a stealth agent for
the defendant.
Decisions awarding attorneys' fees to objectors necessarily
hinge on whether the objectors have helped or hindered the proc-
ess of evaluating a settlement. Courts are loathe to grant objec-
tors attorneys' fees unless they aid or confer a benefit on the class
as a whole, rather than enrich only the objector. '78 The district
judges who award fees to objector's counsel represent assessment
of the positive work that benefits the class action process. '79 Some
degree of novel input that helps the class is necessary to objectors
in their quest for compensation.'
This is not to say that objectors will always provide helpful
input or that they will not free ride off the efforts of class counsel
in initiating suit and the hard work of both defense and class
counsel in negotiating a settlement. True extortionist, free-riding
objectors who provide no added value and who increase the
transactions costs of class actions sometimes exist. When such an
objector is identified, the court may try to impose sanctions. Thus
far, sanctions have been meted out to class actions objectors in
only a handful of cases,' perhaps out of fear that a court of ap-
peals would overturn the sanction. A district judge affirmed the
recommendations of a magistrate that he sanction an objector's
attorney who had made a variety of fee objections, filed Rule 11
motions against class counsel, and tried to recuse the trial court
in the Prudential insurance fraud class action litigation,82 only to
See, for example, Duhaime, 2 F Supp 2d at 176 (D Mass 1998) (asserting that
"[olbiectors are not ordinarily awarded attorneys' fees, except where their efforts have
conferred benefits on class members generally, as distinguished from the objectors them-
selves particularly"); In re the Prudential Insurance Co of America Sales Practices Litiga-
tion, 962 F Supp 572, 593-94 (D NJ 1997) (denying an award of attorneys' fees to counsel
for objectors because they "did not advance the progress of the litigation or sharpen any
issues"); Domestic Air, 148 FRD at 360 (stating that paying fees to objectors' counsel is
appropriate where their work "produced a beneficial effect upon the progress of the litiga-
tion").
"' See, for example, In re Anchor Securities Litigation, 1991 WL 53651 (E D NY)
(counsel "whose actions have conferred a benefit upon a given group or class of litigants
may file a claim for reasonable compensation for his efforts").
" Prudential Insurance, 962 F Supp at 593 n 50 (denying fees to objectors whose
input was "not novel to this Court" and merely duplicated arguments already raised by
states of Florida and Massachusetts).
... Of course, the paucity of sanctions to objector attorneys may be a measure that
objectors benefit the case or, alternatively, the statistical fact that objections are not made
as often as theory would indicate. See text accompanying notes 144-29.
"' In re Prudential Insurance Co of America Sales Practices Litigation, 63 F Supp 2d
516 (D NJ 1999).
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have the court of appeals overturn the sanction.'83 The Seventh
Circuit reversed a fifty thousand dollar Rule 11 sanction against
two California attorneys who had objected to a proposed settle-
ment purporting to represent a client who, when questioned by
the court, knew almost nothing about his objection.14 In Shaw,
the trial judge sanctioned an objecting pro hac vice attorney who
appeared unable to provide reasonable identification of his objec-
tor client.' For reasons probably related more to the law and pol-
icy of sanctions than any analysis of class action objectors, the
prospect of sanctioning extortionist objectors appears to work bet-
ter in theory than in practice.'
The common thread of the decisions supporting objector par-
ticipation in the class action settlement approval process is sim-
ply that objectors might be in a position to provide beneficial in-
formation to a district judge faced with the unenviable task of
assessing the validity of a proposed settlement. Such reasoning
finds support in the proposed revisions to Rule 23, which provide
more procedural structure and clarity to the settlement approval
process. New proposed Rule 23(e)(4)(A) specifically grants the
absent class member the right to object to a proposed settlement
or compromise.'87 The text's silence regarding intervention, to-
" See In re Prudential Insurance Co of America Sales Practice Litigation Agent Ac-
tions, 278 F3d 175, 191-92 (3d Cir 2002) (affirming the court's inherent power to impose
sanctions but overruling the district court's non-monetary sanctions on grounds of insuffi-
cient notice). The concurring and dissenting opinion of Judge Rosenn observed that the
objector "had the wholesome effect of providing a careful scrutiny of the fairness of a gi-
gantic settlement affecting millions of policyholders nationwide." Id at 202 (Rosenn con-
curring and dissenting).
"8 See Vollmer, 248 F3d at 710-11 (reasoning that the district judge had violated due
process by conducting an extra-record investigation into the law practice of the sanctioned
attorneys and because the size of the award, under the circumstances, was excessive). For
a more complete discussion of the Vollmer class action, see text accompanying notes 123.
" 91 F Supp 2d at 975 (sanctioning so-called professional objector Lawrence Schon-
brun by entering an order that he must file a motion for pro hac vice status one week
before his intended appearance and submit a verified affidavit with details about his cli-
ent's identity).
" The court's ability to sanction was diminished in the 1993 revision of FRCP 11. See
Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 146 FRD 401, 583 (1993) (describing
1993 amendments to Rule 11 as designed to "remedy problems that have arisen in the
interpretation and application of the 1983 revision of the rule"); Lawrence C. Marshall,
Herbert H. Kritzer, and Francis Kahn Zemens, The Use and Impact of Rule 11, 86 Nw U L
Rev 943, 958 (1992) (criticizing Rule 11 for causing wasteful satellite litigation); Interim
Report of the Committee on Civility of the Seventh Federal Judicial Circuit, 143 FRD 371,
389 (1992) (criticizing Rule 11 as harming attorney civility and mistrust).
187 Advisory Committee Report at 101-02 (cited in note 8) ("Any class member may
object to a proposed settlement, voluntary dismissal, or compromise that requires court
approval under Rule 23(e)(1)(A).").
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gether with its unqualified right of a class member to object,
yields a conclusion that an objector wishing to file written mate-
rial or be heard orally at a Rule 23(e) hearing need not file an
intervention petition.'88 The accompanying Committee Note "con-
firms" this right to object to a proposed settlement 9
Several of the many individuals who commented upon the
recently proposed amendments to Rule 23 mirrored this theme by
supporting, rather than opposing, a way to embrace objector par-
ticipation.9 9 Of particular interest was the Defense Research In-
stitute's position that "objections should be encouraged, not dis-
couraged," and its position urging an Advisory Committee stan-
dard for determining when to receive objector input.'9 ' The thrust
of these comments was not that objector input is always produc-
tive. Rather, this valuable commentary from the class action fir-
ing lines seems to seek a more refined process that could welcome
objector input that would, on balance, improve the court's ability
to assess a proposed settlement.
The question of whether and to what extent so-called "side
agreements" between objectors and other counsel must be dis-
closed informs the debate about whether class action objectors
are a beneficial or a counterproductive force. In the free-riding
story, the extortionist objector will seek blackmail in the form of
attorneys' fees from the already negotiated settlement pot.
See FRCP 23(e).
Advisory Committee Report at 106 (cited in note 8) (stating that proposed Rule
23(e)(4) "confirms the right of class members to object to a proposed settlement" and bas-
ing this right upon the binding effect of the settlement).
" See, for example, id at 180-85 (summarizing comments from (1) Professor Judith
Resnik, referring to the goal of making information available to the judge to assess a set-
tlement, (2) Leslie Brueckner, Esq., arguing that "[o]bjectors often will be the only means
to expose the weaknesses of the settlement," (3) Brian Wolfman, Esq., claiming that objec-
tor input is valuable and that "[o]bjectors must be provided substantial procedural sup-
port," (4) Beverly C. Moore, Jr., Esq., stating that "I1]egitimate objectors face real prob-
lems," and (5) National Association of Protection & Advocacy Systems, arguing that the
Committee Note accompanying the proposed rule changes "may chill desirable objec-
tions"). See also Linda S. Mullenix, Resolving Aggregate Mass Tort Litigation: The New
Private Law Dispute Resolution Paradigm, 33 Val U L Rev 413, 440-41 (1999) (noting that
.objectors have indeed played a crucial role in keeping all the players honest" and pointing
out that the same objector attorney litigated challenges to the Supreme Court in the
Ahearn and in the Amchem cases).
"' Advisory Committee Report at 182 (cited in note 8) (summarizing testimony of
Patrick Lysaught, Esq., for the Defense Research Institute, and noting that the Commit-
tee Note needs to provide guidance regarding what is a proper basis for objecting and
specifying a prima facie evidentiary showing). The Defense Research Institute,
founded in 1960 to enhance the skills of defense lawyers, is a national
"membership organization of all lawyers and involved in the defense of civil litigation,"
available online at <http://www.dri.orgtdri/abouttmission.cfin> (visited Apr 7, 2003).
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Should this tactic be successful, the objector attorney will fold his
tent and withdraw the objection. Settlement terms of this nature,
like most settlements, are essentially private matters.'92 In a pri-
vate side deal, the free-riding extortionist has been bought off,
the potentially valuable objection fails to be considered by the
district court, and the settlement approval hearing loses the
drama of having the objector's contest conducted in public.9
Privacy is particularly crucial to the workings of a side deal.
It is important to keep the terms of a true buy-out from the trial
court that is scrutinizing the settlement, and from other potential
critics of the buy-out. It is also important to keep the side deal
from the press who has found class action reporting particularly
newsworthy.
9 4
By discouraging potentially extortionist private side deals
and making the terms of these agreements public, courts are
much less likely to approve a tainted buy-out settlement. More-
over, a rule that would require that all side deals with objectors
be transparent may deter the initiation of such side deals in the
first place.'95 The Second Circuit used this rationale when it af-
firmed a trial court order that required a class counsel fee-
sharing agreements to be openly disclosed to the district judge
because "[o]nly by reviewing the agreement prospectively will the
district courts be able to prevent potential conflicts from aris-
ing.,, 196
The virtues of transparent side deals and disclosure led to
the present proposed change to Rule 23(e)(4)(B), mandating that
"[an objection made under Rule 23(e)(4)(A) may be withdrawn
only with the court's approval."'97 Although this draft does not
seek to ban side deals-almost a practical impossibility-it does
put their terms before the trial judge and require judicial inquiry
"92 See Brunet and Craver, Alternative Dispute Resolution at 182 (cited in note 131)
(stressing that settlements are typically confidential and secret).
193 See Bone, The Economics of Civil Procedure at 279 (cited in note 20) (describing
side deals between counsel for the objector and class counsel and the defendant in a trans-
action that "settles the attorney's individual claims for a premium, or by making slight
adjustments to the settlement so the attorney can argue that he benefitted the class and
thus deserves a higher fee").
... See, for example, Hensler, Class Action Dilemmas at 53 (cited in note 39) (charting
over 3200 stories in about class actions in the general press and over 300 in the business
press in 1995-96).
"' Id at 494 (arguing that payments to objectors to settle claims "ought to be disclosed
to the judge, and arguably to class members as well").
" In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation, 818 F2d 216, 226 (2d Cir 1987).
191 Advisory Committee Report at 102 (cited in note 8).
[2003:446
403] CURRENT ISSUES IN CLASS ACTION LITIGATION 447
into their validity.9 The accompanying Committee Note supports
the idea of the trial court questioning the withdrawn objection by
mandating judicial review if an objection is formally withdrawn,
and stating that "if the objector simply abandons pursuit of the
objection, the court may inquire into the circumstances."199 In
other words, the court must do more than just look for an objec-
tion that is formally withdrawn; the district judge must somehow
look out for objections that are not vigorously argued.
Though combative commentary to the proposed Rule
23(e)(4)(B) provision for the disclosure of side deals may have
created the potential for trench warfare, such commentary never
materialized. Like the proposed Rule itself, the bulk of the com-
mentary to it supports the value of objector input by making it
more difficult to keep side arrangements private. Most of the
comments broadly support full information disclosure regarding
side deals.00 Several comments make the points that parties
would have an incentive not to disclose side deals, and that the
court needs the ability to sanction the parties to ensure compli-
ance.20 1 These comments have a measure of truth; a rule requiring
disclosure of side deals to the court will be difficult to police.
Nonetheless, this norm should work a degree of in terrorem dis-
closure, and is a considerable improvement over the status quo,
which is one of free-wheeling, silent side deals that are a license
to extort.
Some attention to the timing and nature of objector partici-
pation is required. In order to provide helpful information to the
court, the objector needs information. Objectors often surface fol-
" The Class Action Fairness Act of 2001, pending in Congress, prohibits the payment
of bounties and may effectively ban side deals with some class members. See S 1712,
107th Cong, 1st Sess, (Nov 15, 2002) in 147 Cong Rec S11947.
"9 Advisory Committee Report at 107 (cited in note 8).See, for example, id at 174-79 (summarizing positions of (1) Professor Judith Res-
nik, arguing that "[flull disclosure of side agreements of all kinds should be required", (2)Leslie Brueckner, Esq., stating that parties should be required to be disclose side agree-
ments, (3) Brian Wolfman, Esq., claiming that side agreement filing should be mandatory
and should include the full agreement rather than a summary, (4) the Federal TradeCommission, positing that judicial oversight requires that the court be fully informed as to
the context of any settlement, and (5) Professor Susan Koniak, arguing that the "rule
should provide strong and mandatory sanctions for failing to disclose such deals"). But seeid at 177 (noting statement of Professor Charles Silver that fee provisions of proposed rule
and commentary "reflects an unwarranted preference for regulation over private ar-
rangements").
"'1 Id at 176-78 (cited in note 8) (summarizing comments from (1) Leslie Brueckner,
Esq., arguing that "the settling parties have every incentive not to disclose the existence of
related agreements" and that the "proposal lacks teeth," and (2) Professor Susan Koniak,
claiming that sanctions should be added because "the urge to cheat is great").
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lowing receipt of class action notice and have little time to collect
their own information, formulate a coherent position, and for-
mally object to the court. There will be cases where some discov-
ery is essential to the objectors. °2 It is reasonable to predict that
a legitimate objector may need some discovery relating to the
merits of the case in order to assess the real value of a proposed
settlement. Such a request should be granted.0 3 This process
takes time. District courts need to find a way to give potentially
useful objectors adequate time to collect information that will
allow them to make meaningful objections.2 4 While granting this
extra time comes at a cost, the increase in legitimate participa-
tion that informs the court should result in a benefit to the cru-
cial process of monitoring the class action settlement.
III. PUBLIC SECTOR MONITORS: MONITORING BY THE STATE,
PUBLIC INTEREST GROUPS, AND GUARDIANS
Not all class actions objections arise when private practitio-
ners file objections on behalf of class members. Some class actions
objections are filed by state or federal agencies, sometimes pro-
ceeding on a parens patriae basis.00 In other instances, public
interest groups who have identified class action abuse as a wor-
thy investment of their scarce resources file objections.0 ' A third
type of objection to a potentially corrupt class action settlement
can be filed by a court-appointed guardian.0 7 This Part focuses on
the theory and nature of objections filed by entities in the public
sector.
Each of these three types of objectors, while analytically dis-
tinct, shares several common characteristics. These objections
' See text accompanying notes 136-42 (discussing availability of discovery to objec-
tors). See also Geoffrey P. Miller, Competing Bids in Class Action Settlements, 31 Hofstra
L Rev 633, 635 (2003) (noting that objectors are often poorly informed).
" See Cooper, Future of Class Actions, 40 Ariz L Rev at 950 (cited in note 134) (con-
tending that "objectors should be supported by full (and guided) access to discovery mate-
rials, if the litigation (or earlier individual litigation) has generated adequate discovery, or
by a realistic opportunity to engage in discovery on the merits"). Professor Cooper urges
that objectors be given access to discovery on the negotiation process itself. Id.
See Advisory Committee Report at 229-30 (cited in note 8) (summarizing (1) Judi-
cial Conference input that the present "time periods for disclosure and objecting often
make informed objections impossible" and lamenting that "[o]ften an objector has to fight
counsel to get the documents" needed to object, and (2) quoting Victor Schwartz, Esq., that
it is of "paramount importance to notify the class members about fee hearings so that they
may be informed before the class attorneys' fees are set in cement").
See text accompanying notes 208-223, 226-236.
See text accompanying notes 237-273.
207 See text accompanying notes 274-279, 283-292, 294-312.
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will likely be led by specialist attorneys, who may be able to per-
form quality monitoring. Also, these objectors exist with very fo-
cused missions that operate somewhat outside of a free market
profit motive. Analysis of incentives, critical to monitoring poten-
tial, might be different for these objectors. In addition, the free-
rider problem that plagues class action objectors works differ-
ently for these public sector parties. While these public sector
objectors follow earlier filed class actions in a way that resembles
free riding, they lack the profit motive that leads to extortion and,
thus, do not create the same type of free-riding scenario that
characterizes the private practitioner who files class action objec-
tions.
At present, I speculate that objections by these three groups
are filed in a small percentage of class actions. Public interest
groups and state and federal agencies have very limited resources
that prevent, in their own prosecutorial discretion, routine par-
ticipation in class actions.2"8 Yet, public sector objections hold
enough promise and appear with sufficient frequency to merit a
closer examination.
A. The State or Federal Government as a Class
Action Objector
Participation in class actions by states is increasingly com-
mon.0 9 States may become class action players either by filing a
parens patriae suit as a class action or, alternatively, by interven-
ing in an already existing class action." ' The tobacco litigation
brought by the states against the manufacturers of tobacco prod-
ucts illustrates the parens patriae form of participation. 211 Similar
products liability style claims have been brought against entire
industries, including the lead paint industry, gun manufacturers,
and even health maintenance organizations. 12 The latter situa-
See, for example, Hensler, Class Action Dilemmas at 495 (cited in note 39) (ac-
knowledging that "public interest lawyers are perennially strapped for resources").
" See generally, Brunet, Improving Class Action Efficiency, 74 Tulane L Rev at 1921
(cited in note 32).
210 See, for example, In re Mid-Atlantic Toyota Antitrust Litigation, 605 F Supp 440,
449 (C D MD 1984) (approving settlement of state parens patriae actions in a price-fixing
context).
211 See, for example, Texas v American Tobacco Co, 14 F Supp 2d at 965; R.J. Reynolds
Tobacco Co v Engle, 672 S2d 39, 42 (Fla Ct App 1996) (certifying a statewide tobacco class
action).
21 See, for example, Texas v American Tobacco Co, 14 F Supp 2d at 965 (allowing a
parens patriae suit by the state of Texas against the tobacco industry to recover Medicaid
losses); Scott v American Tobacco Co, 725 So 2d 10, 18 (La Ct App 4th Cir 1998) (affirming
449
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tion is illustrated by state agencies intervening or, at times, seek-
ing amicus curiae status in pending class suits to complain about
the terms of a proposed settlement or to take a position not pres-
ently advanced by the private practitioners initiating the litiga-
tion. For example, the states of New York, Massachusetts, Penn-
sylvania, and Nevada joined a class action suit against the auto-
mobile insurer State Farm in a suit dealing with the issue of
whether the insurance company's use of generic automobile parts
constituted consumer fraud.1 3 The State of Texas Insurance De-
partment joined several class actions to oppose the size of attor-
neys' fees in proposed settlements.214 The California public em-
ployee pension fund (CALPERS) intervened in shareholder law-
suits pending in New York.2 5 The Texas Attorney General ob-
jected to a proposed settlement of a Pennsylvania class action
against Conseco, Inc, regarding whether nursing home policies
misled elderly insureds."6 The Texas Attorney General inter-
vened and obtained an additional two million dollars in a Texas
class action against automobile insurers accused of illegal double
rounding of periodic bill payments.27 The nature of state adminis-
trative agency participation in class actions is understandably
diverse, reflecting the broad group of political views that charac-
terize governmental action.
At the same time, the federal government sometimes be-
comes a player in class action litigation. While probably less
common than state intervention into pending aggregative litiga-
tion, federal involvement can constitute a major force. The Ninth
Circuit singled out the positive participation of the Department of
trial court certification of a medical monitoring class of state residents); Richard P. Ieyoub
and Theodore Eisenberg, State Attorney General Actions, the Tobacco Litigation and the
Doctrine of Parens Patriae, 74 Tulane L Rev 1859, 1860-62 (2000).
"' See Matthew L. Wald, Suit Against Auto Insurer Could Affect Nearly All Drivers,
NY Times Section 1 29 (Sept 27, 1998) (describing litigation brought to prevent use of
generic parts).
214 See Michael Totty, Insurance Commissioner Ruffles Consumer Activists, Wall St J
T1 (Feb 18, 1998) (detailing that consumer groups agreed that fees were high, but accused
the Insurance Commissioner of damaging the overall recovery to the plaintiff class).
2.. See Diana B. Henriques, Big Pension Fund Joins Suits to Recover Payouts by
W.R.Grace, NY Times D8 (Apr 3, 1996).
"'3 See Ann Davis and Joseph T. Hallinan, Conseco's Class-Action Settlement Proposal
is Criticized as Inadequate by Some Groups, Wall St J B8 (Feb 1, 2002) (summarizing
objectors who criticize proposed settlement for offering no cash to plaintiff class members
and conferring little real benefit).
2' See Hensler, Class Action Dilemmas at 279-80, 461 (cited in note 39) (explaining
that an additional two million dollars was to be used by the Texas Attorney General's
Consumer Protection Division for consumer education).
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Justice as "a significant factor in quieting the potential for unfair
treatment of minority interests within the plaintiffs' class" in a
class action where the government took part in settlement nego-
tiations.218 In addition, the Federal Trade Commission has re-
cently challenged proposed class action attorneys' fees awards in
several actions;219 the Securities Exchange Commission main-
tained a policy during the Clinton Administration to intervene in
pending securities class actions;220 the Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission has intervened in pending race discrimination
class actions;"' and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
215 See Mendoza v United States, 623 F2d 1338, 1353 (9th Cir 1980) (noting that the
DOJ had come into the case before trial and been an "active participant" that "serve[d] to
protect the interests of the class against possible improper dealings").
29 See Caroline E. Mayer, FTC Seeks to Limit Attorney Fees in Class Action Suits,
Wash Post A17 (Sept 30, 2002) (quoting FTC Chairman Timothy J. Muris, that the agency
is interested in challenging coupon settlements where coupons are worth a fraction of
their face value and attorneys' fees where the class action was filed following earlier case
filings or investigations by the agency, and noting that the FTC had objected to attorneys'
fees in three class actions in 2002); Carter v ICR Services Inc, Memorandum Opinion on
Proposed Settlement 2, 5-6, Civ Action 00-C-2666-W (N D Ala Sept 6, 2002) (allowing FTC
to participate as a class action objector with amicus curiae status, noting that the FTC
"has actively monitored the developments in this case," but approving, over agency's objec-
tion, $1.235 million in attorneys' fees in a case involving a five million dollar common fund
for class members); Erikson v Ameritech Corporation, Memorandum Order, No 99 CH
18873 (Cook Co Ill Cir Ct Sept 18, 2002) (rejecting proposed settlement of consumer fraud
class action brought by voice mail subscribers where FTC and several states objected to
the proposed conduct relief as inadequately compensating class members); FTC v Equinox
International Corp, FTC Brief in Opposition to Class Counsel's Fee Petition, (Sept 2000)(arguing that existence of a prior government enforcement action preceding a class action
should be a factor in reducing class counsels fee, citing Donnarumma v Barracuda Tanker
Corp, 79 FRD 455, 468 (C D Cal 1978)).
See, for example, Michael Siconolfi and Jeffrey Taylor, SEC Steps Up Intervention
in Class Action Pacts, Wall St J C1 (June 2, 1995) (reporting that agency will not just
intervene on appeal, but will consider coming into class action securities cases at earlier
stages because of "abuses in the litigation process involving class actions"); Michael Sico-
nolfi, SEC Fights Legal Fees in Prudential Case to Cut Fees for Plaintiffs' Lawyers, Wall St
J B8 (Mar 9, 1994) (stating that SEC decision to intervene in a securities class action
"reflects the new tone set by SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt in a January speech to securi-
ties regulators" that agency would advise courts on the "appropriateness of proposed set-
tlements"). See also In re Cendant Corp Litigation, 264 F3d 201, 231 (3d Cir 2001) (noting
that SEC participated as amicus curiae in a class action to advance the position that auc-
tions to select class counsel are not consistent with the Private Securities Litigation Re-
form Act of 1995); Goldberger v Integrated Resources, Inc, 209 F3d 43, 53-54 (2d Cir 2000)(affirming trial court approval of lodestar fee to class counsel in securities fraud class
action because the attorneys for the class were aided by the prior work done by govern-
ment attorneys who criminally prosecuted officers of defendant); In re Quantum Health
Resources Inc Securities Litigation, 962 F Supp 1254, 1259 (C D Cal 1997) (reducing at-
torneys' fee in securities class action to 10 percent because prior agency investigations
benefitted class counsel).
2 See Mary Williams Walsh, U.S. Joins in 2 Bias Suits Against Lockheed Martin, NY
Times C1 (Dec 6, 2000) (reporting agency decision to intervene in Title VII class actions
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has intervened in a class action against credit card issuing
banks.2
The process of government attorneys raising objections to the
conduct of pending class actions should be distinguished from
that of private law firm attorneys purporting to represent absent
class members. First and foremost, the agency cost monitoring
problem should be less severe. While the objector client is unable
to monitor his own attorney, the prospect of an attorney who
works for the state monitoring the class action plaintiff's attorney
is more plausible.223
Of course, not all attorneys are created equal. Varying de-
grees of class action and substantive expertise differentiate law-
yers. One might argue that attorneys for state agencies, for ex-
ample, lack the expertise in the class action field to appropriately
monitor class counsel. How can attorneys with limited real world
class action experience monitor repeat class action players? There
may be a huge information gulf between the state agency attor-
ney monitor and counsel for Milberg, Weiss.
However, several counterpoints address this potential prob-
lem. First, counsel for the state agency may provide considerable
substantive expertise. A lack of procedural class action experience
should not doom the state agency's ability to evaluate a settle-
ment's adequacy. Much of our present thinking about the ade-
quacy of a settlement focuses upon substance-whether the set-
tlement approximates a probable trial result.2 ' The proposed set-
against Lockheed Martin Corporation); Douglas A. Blackmon, EEOC Seeks to Join a
Class-Action Suit Alleging Racial Discrimination at UPS, Wall St J A4 (June 2, 1997)
(reporting agency motion to intervene in a St. Louis discrimination class action against
United Parcel Service).
222 See Heaton v Monogram Credit Card Bank of Georgia, 297 F3d 416, 426 (5th Cir
2002) (noting effort by FDIC to intervene either of right or permissively, concluding that
motion to intervene was mooted by dismissal of substantive claim, and reporting that
FDIC did participate).
' See, for example, Carter, Civ No O0-C-2666-W at 5 (noting that the FTC "has ac-
tively monitored the developments in this case and it has assisted the Court in assuring
that individualized notices were sent to most of the class members").
See, for example, Reynolds v Beneficial National Bank, 288 F3d 277, 284-85 (7th
Cir 2002) (reversing class action settlement approval because trial court did not make a
greater effort to determine the probable value of the plaintiffs' case at trial); Crawford v
Equifax Payment Services, Inc, 201 F3d 877, 882 (7th Cir 2000) (reversing district court
approval of settlement because it "is substantively troubling"); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr.,
Class Certification Based On Merits of the Claims, 69 Tenn L Rev 1, 4 (2001) (arguing that
merits of case are relevant to the class action certification determination).
[2003:452
403] CURRENT ISSUES IN CLASS ACTION LITIGATION
tlement will be negotiated in the shadow of the substantive law.225
The attorney for an agency will likely be strong on substance, if
not as strong on procedure.
Moreover, a state or federal agency should have access to
enough decent procedural advice to be, in a structural sense, an
adequate procedural monitor. State and federal agencies are of-
ten parties to the paradigm big cases. Government lawyers settle
and litigate cases with giant monetary consequences."6 It is hard
to believe that a state lawyer could not consult with another more
experienced colleague about class action procedure settlement
strategies. While there are, of course, transaction costs to seeking
monitoring help from other government attorneys, agencies are
administered like law firms227 and should be able to efficiently
access procedural specialization.
In a particular state or agency, there may be a realization
that the ability to monitor a class action is simply lacking. In that
case, the state may contract out for class action monitoring exper-
tise. This is essentially what happened when the states brought
suit and negotiated their giant settlement with the tobacco indus-
try. Leading members of the states' class action bars were hired
by the states to offer valuable (and expensive) class action exper-
tise.228
It is clear that agency counsel possess the substantive abili-
ties to monitor a settlement by class counsel. The remaining
question concerns their incentive. Because they toil at a govern-
See Robert H. Mnookin and Lewis Kornhauser,Bargaining in the Shadow of the
Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 Yale L J 950, 968-69 (1979) (asserting that substantive legal
principles work their way into the settlements of civil cases).
See, for example, John R. Wilke, Microsoft Reaches Tentative Antitrust Pact, Wall
St J A3 (Nov 1, 2001) (describing how government attorneys negotiated landmark settle-
ment intended to rein in company's monopoly power); Kurt Eichenwald, Archer Daniels
Agrees to Big Fine for Price Fixing, NY Times Al (Oct 15, 1996) (government attorneys
negotiate $100 million settlement following price fixing finding against Archer Daniels
Midland Company).
" See Brunet, 74 Tulane L Rev at 1934 (cited in note 32) (asserting that state attor-
ney general's offices are analogous to law firms, with specialist attorneys and broad juris-
diction over a variety of issues and that smaller agencies often approach state attorney
general's offices for guidance); Frank J. Kelley, Changes in the State's Law Firm Over the
Past Twenty Years, 29 Wayne L Rev 267, 268 (1983) (labeling the Michigan state attorney
general's office as the "state's law firm").
See Brunet, 74 Tulane L Rev at 1934 (cited in note 32); James V. Grimaldi, Lawyers
Could Get Billions In Tobacco Deal, Seattle Times Al (Oct 5, 1997) (describing payment of
$14.7 billion to private lawyers brought into the tobacco litigation by forty states); Daniel
Bice, Tobacco Suit May be First Solo, Milwaukee Journal-Sentinel 1 (Dec 16, 1996) (noting
that state of Wisconsin was first and only state not to hire private practitioners to repre-
sent it in negotiating settlement of tobacco litigation).
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ment salary, some may question whether government attorneys
possess enough incentive to assess cases involving significant
stakes and the class action attorneys working with altogether
different monetary incentives. Moreover, some argue that gov-
ernment agency attorneys themselves are unmonitored due to the
ambiguity that exists regarding their precise duties of loyalty.229
Government attorneys have different incentives than class
action counsel.2 30 The culture of the agency workplace is simply
different than that in which a private attorney works. Rather
than aspire to monetary rewards, the typical agency attorney
seeks prominence generally, and peer group acceptance, particu-
larly.23' The prototypical agency attorney may be motivated by a
culture that seeks adherence to a particular mission.232 Such in-
stitutional goals are increasingly set out in written agency mis-
sion statements that help to unify and sharpen the purposes of
both individual agency personnel and the entity itself.233 In order
See, for example, Jonathan R. Macey and Geoffrey P. Miller, Reflections on Profes-
sional Responsibility in a Regulatory State, 63 Geo Wash L Rev 1105, 1118 (1995) (arguing
that unlike private sector lawyers, "[plublic-sector lawyers, by contrast, often do not have
the benefit of a clearly defined client" and noting the lack of monitoring of the agency
attorney). See also Note, Rethinking the Professional Responsibilities of Federal Agency
Lawyers, 115 Harv L Rev 1170, 1181 (2002) (arguing that an agency attorney has no read-
ily discernable client and setting forth multiple conflicting clients for the federal agency
lawyer, ranging from the agency itself to the public interest to other individuals working
for the agency).
... See Jonathan R. Macey, Lawyers in Agencies: Economics, Social Psychology, and
Process, 61 L & Contemp Probs 109, 114 (Spring 1998) ("Lawyers in administrative agen-
cies are likely to have values, attitudes, and perspectives different from those found in a
random sample of the population.").
" See Ronald N. Johnson and Gary D. Libecap, Agency Growth, Salaries and the
Protected Bureaucrat, 27 Economic Inquiry 431, 448 (1989) (noting that for the "top-
ranked personnel, those who may be in a position to influence policy, salary does not ap-
pear to be the major motivating force, as their salaries are capped"). Compare Macey, 61 L
& Contemp Probs at 110 (cited in note 230) (pointing out that "[1]awyers' professional
responsibilities are directed toward their clients, rather than either toward more selfish
ends such as self-aggrandizement, or toward more global ends such as justice or effi-
ciency").
12 Johnson and Libecap, 27 Econ Inquiry at 448 (cited at note 231) (concluding that
top agency personnel associate "with the mission of the agency"); Note, 115 Harv L Rev at
1173-76 (cited in note 229) (advancing contrasting models of the government lawyer's
loyalty as to her employing client, the agency, or alternatively, to the public interest or the
common good); Steven K Berenson, Public Lawyers, Private Values: Can, Should, and
Will Government Lawyers Serve the Public Interest?, 41 BC L Rev 789, 789-90 (2000) (as-
serting that "government lawyers have greater responsibilities to pursue the common good
or the public interest than their counterparts in private practice"); Macey, 61 L & Con-
temp Probs at 112-13 (cited in note 230) (referring to lawyers' tendency to align actions
and ideas).
See, for example, 12 CFR § 650.22(b) (2002) (mandating the adoption of a mission
statement of Federal Agricultural Mortgage Corporation); Environmental Protection
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to be promoted within the agency, a government attorney will
have to perform well and in a manner consistent with the formal
agency mission. Motivation should come from the agency's pub-
lic service mission itself.
235
To be sure, there are some government attorneys who may be
motivated more by monetary or personal advancement considera-
tions than by a stated public service mission that may have been
formulated long ago or by more altruistic colleagues.236 Such
Agency, Agency Mission Statement, available online at <www.epa.gov/history/
org/origins/mission.htm> (stating that "the mission of the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency is to protect human health and to safeguard the natural environment-air, water,
and land-upon which life depends") (visited Apr 7, 2003); US Food and Drug Administra-
tion, FDA's Mission, available online at <www.fda.gov/opacom/morechoices/mission.html>
(stating that the mission of the agency is to "promote the public health by promptly and
efficiently reviewing clinical research and taking appropriate action on the marketing of
regulated products in a timely manner;" by "ensuring that foods are safe, wholesome,
sanitary, and properly labeled;" by assuring safe and effective use of devices, safe and
properly labeled cosmetics and by protecting public health from electronic product radia-
tion) (visited Apr 7, 2003); Federal Trade Commission, Vision, Mission & Goals, available
online at <www.ftc.gov/ft/mission.htm> (stating that the agency "seeks to ensure that the
nation's markets function competitively," that unfair or deceptive acts are eliminated, that
consumers may "exercise informed choice," and that economic analysis will support its
efforts) (visited Apr 7, 2003); Central Intelligence Agency, CIA Vision, Mission and Values,
available online at <www.cia.gov/cia/information/mission.html> (stating that mission is to
support those who make national security policy by "providing accurate, evidence-based,
comprehensive, and timely foreign intelligence related to national security;" and conduct-
ing counterintelligence and "other functions related to foreign intelligence and national
security as directed by the President") (visited Apr 7, 2003); California Department of
Education, Institutional Operational Standards, 5 CCR § 72705(a) (2002) (mandating,
through agency regulation, that an "institution shall have a written statement of its mis-
sion, purposes, and objectives"); California Department of Corporations, Mission, available
online at <www.corp.ca.gov/aboutus.htm> (stating that agency will "rigorously enforce the
laws of the state, ensuring that all of California's financial services consumers enter the
marketplace with confidence," educate the public about "the risks and rewards of invest-
ing," and provide business a financial services marketplace that is transparent and effi-
cient) (visited Apr 7, 2003); Illinois Department of Insurance, Mission Statement, avail-
able online at <www.ins.state.il.us/main/overview.htm> (stating that mission "is to protect
consumers by providing assistance and information, by efficiently regulating the insur-
ance industry's market behavior and financial solvency, and by fostering a competitive
insurance marketplace") (visited Apr 7, 2003).
See, for example, William A. Niskanen, Jr., Bureaucracy and Representative Gov-
ernment 38 (Aldine Atherton 1971) (noting that decisions by bureaucrats are made to
maximize utility, and that utility can include reputation, power, salary, and perquisites).
See Note, 115 Harv L Rev at 1188 (cited in note 229) (contending that the govern-
ment lawyer "must determine at the outset of her work the agency's provisional objectives
on a given issue ... [and] must then independently evaluate those objectives from her
perspective as the agency's legal expert").
See, for example, Macey and Miller, 63 Geo Wash L Rev at 1111 (cited in note 229)
(arguing that government attorneys try to advance their own importance within their
agencies rather than pursue the public interest); Anthony Downs, Inside Bureaucracy 82
(Little, Brown 1967) (stressing the tendency of individuals who work for bureaucracies to
subordinate public goals and advance private self interest).
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agency lawyers may nonetheless excel. They may have a plan to
eventually be noticed by law firms in the free market. The steady
migration of agency personnel to jobs practicing their specialty
with law firms supports the monetary thesis. Whether motivated
to do high quality work to advance personal self-interest or sim-
ply by a culture that seeks peer acceptance and attainment of the
public good, there is little reason to think that the government
attorney will lack an incentive to monitor class actions effectively.
B. The Public Interest Group Objector
The filing of objections to proposed class action settlements
by public interest groups is already an established phenomenon.
Two very different public interest groups, Public Citizen and
Trial Lawyers for Public Justice, each routinely participate in
class actions-usually by representing objectors unhappy with
the terms of a proposed settlement.237 The participation of these
two high-profile litigation-based public interest groups reflects
their respective decisions that class action settlements constitute
a public interest issue of the highest order, meritorious of invest-
ing hard won interest group dollars into improving the settlement
of a class suit.
The phenomenon of public interest group objection is sup-
plemented by occasional objections filed by single-issue public
interest groups, who identify an issue of interest to their focused
constituency and try to present their interests to a court. For ex-
See, for example, Hensler, Class Action Dilemmas at 45 n 116, 89-91 (cited in note
39) (noting that "Public Citizens' lawyers had appeared as objectors to some of the most
widely criticized class action settlement agreements" and that Public Citizen and Trial
Lawyers for Public Justice "have objected to a number of proposed class action settlements
in recent years"); Paul M. Barrett, Civil Action: Why Americans Look to Courts to Cure the
Nation's Social Ills, Wall St J Al, A10 (Jan 4, 2000) (describing class action lawyers and
referring to Public Citizen as a "pro-consumer firm that regularly intervenes in class ac-
tions to try to reduce legal fees"); Van Voris, Plaintiff Bar Divided, Natl L J at Al (cited in
note 33) (reporting that "both Public Citizen and TLPJ have aggressively targeted class
action settlements that recover little for class members while surrendering the right of
plaintiffs to have their day in court"); Reske, Two Wins for Class Action Objectors, 82 ABA
J at 36 (cited in note 33) (explaining that Public Citizen, a group representing consumer
interests, had either represented or assisted objectors "in 13 class actions involving prod-
ucts ranging from Mustang convertibles to Dalkon Shield intrauterine devices"); Wade
Lambert, Public Interest Law Group Fights Some Class Settlements as Unfair, Wall St J
B4 (Aug 17, 1995) (reporting that "Trial Lawyers for Public Justice, a public interest law
group that brings class action suits and is funded by plaintiffs' lawyers, is now making a
concerted effort to fight class action settlements it views as unfair" and acknowledging
that the Class Action Abuse Project, begun in 1995, pits the group against some of its own
supporters).
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ample, the American Association of Retired Persons objected to a
class action settlement between a class of holders of nursing
home and home care insurance policies and the defendant in-
surer, arguing that the settlement conferred little real benefit on
the elderly class.238 Similarly, the New York chapter of the Na-
tional Organization for Women represented objectors who com-
plained that the proposed settlement of a sex discrimination class
action against Salomon Smith Barney overcompensated the at-
torneys for the class and underpaid class members.239
The volume of class action objections reviewed and filed by
Trial Lawyers for Public Justice ("TLPJ") is not insubstantial.
Since beginning its "Class Action Abuse Project"4 ' in 1995, TLPJ
attorneys review between fifty and seventy proposed settlements
in class actions per year and file objections in cases deemed "par-
ticularly unfair or illegal."24' The TLPJ Website contains a sum-
mary of noteworthy recent class action objections filed by the
group." 2 TLPJ has challenged over twenty "highly objectionable
class action proposed settlements and obtained successful results
in almost every case." 43 The breadth of the class actions in which
TLPJ has appeared to represent objectors is diverse. It includes
objections to a proposed fifty-five million dollar settlement of
z" See Davis and Hallinan, Conseco's, Wall St J at B8 (cited in note 216).
See, for example, Patrick McGeehan, Settlement of Bias Suit is Delayed, Wall St J
C1 (June 25, 1998) (describing rejection of proposed settlement in case involving alleged
fraternity-style sexual harassment antics in basement "boom-boom room" of Garden City,
NY branch office of defendant because spending fifteen million dollars on diversity pro-
grams was too vague and inadequate for a large company); Suit Settlement at Smith
Barney Meets Challenge, Wall St J B10A (Aug 17, 1998), 1998 WL-WSJ 3505687 (report-
ing objections by three members of the "boom-boom room" class action against Smith
Barney because of alleged conflict of interest of mediator who helped parties reach settle-
ment, alleged inadequate representation by class counsel, and alleged secret agreements
in the settlement process).
" See Brief Amicus Curiae of Trial Lawyers for Public Justice, Stephenson v Dow
Chemical Co, Case No 00-7455(L), at 1 (2d Cir 2001) (asserting that "TLPJ has estab-
lished a Class Action Abuse Prevention Project dedicated to monitoring, exposing, and
preventing abuses of the class action device nationwide").
"' Bob Van Voris, Kansas Case in Class by Itself, Natl L J Al, A13 (March 15, 1999)
(reporting on case where TLPJ objected to a proposed settlement of a class suit which
would have required homeowner members of an opt-out class to sell their homes as part of
deal negotiated by class counsel); Telephone Interview with Leslie Brueckner, Staff Attor-
ney, TLPJ (Jan 14, 2003) (explaining that TLPJ challenges proposed class action settle-
ments that violate existing class action rules or are inherently unfair to class members).
2 See Trial Lawyers for Public Justice, Current Cases, available online at
<http://www.tlpj.org/key-current_cases.htm> (describing class action abuse project and
summarizing five selective cases, briefs, and press releases) (visited Aug 9, 2003).
" Boehr v Bank of America, No. CIV 99 22 65 PHX PGR (D Ariz 2001), Declaration of
Arthur H. Bryant, TLPJ, at % 11.
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claims arising out of a release of arsenic from a chemical plant; 44
criticisms that a proposed settlement of a West Virginia class ac-
tion against Liggett Group, Inc, gave the class members almost
nothing, while releasing the defendant from further liability from
claims by smokers;2 45 objections that a class action settlement by
a class of customers who paid allegedly illegal home mortgage
escrow fees was unfair because few members of the class would
redeem coupons awarded to class member victims;246 and com-
plaints that a proposed settlement of claims by a class of automo-
bile insureds-who alleged that their insurer, MassMutual, had
not fully disclosed information regarding periodic payment of
premiums charges-had failed to include any type of compensa-
tion for five million past policyholders. 47 It is noteworthy that the
Class Action Abuse Project pits TLPJ against one of its own natu-
ral constituencies-the plaintiff's trial lawyer bar."8 The objec-
tions filed by TLPJ are often directed at settlements negotiated
by the same trial lawyers who are this organization's actual and
potential contributors.
244 See Lambert, Public Interest Group Fights, Wall St J at B4 (cited in note 237) (re-
porting that proposed settlement failed to provide fairly for future claimants and failed to
use proper notice).
" See Bob Van Voris, Liggett Deal Suddenly Turns Sour, Nati L J A7 (June 16, 1997).
..6 See Bob Van Voris, $1 Million Bond May Discourage Future Fee Challenges, Nat] L
J A6 (July 13, 1998) (reporting that class action lawyers wanted objectors to post a one
million dollar bond to appeal and quoting class counsel stating, "[y]ou can't just walk in,
disrupt the rights of thousands of people and say 'too bad' after their rights have expired
because you wanted to pursue your appeal"). For TLPJ objections to a similar case, see
Bob Van Voris, Court Must Clip Coupon Pact-TLPJ, Natl L J A20 (June 8, 1998) (report-
ing that TLPJ complained that "class counsel is going to get a significant fee and it is very
likely that the class will get next to nothing" and that TLPJ expert affidavits estimated
that fewer than 1 percent of the class of over 100,000 former mortgagors would complete
the complicated steps to get a rebate).
.7 See Bob Van Voris, Insurance Class Deal Criticized, Natl L J at A4 (Feb 19, 2001)
(reporting that a proposed settlement in a federal class action in New Mexico would man-
date new disclosures for 1.1 million current policyholders and would compensate the sole
practitioner class counsel by awarding him five million dollars in cash, a three million
dollar life insurance policy, and a $250,000 per year annuity for his life, while paying
$350,000 to the two class representatives, including $250,000 to one representative who
was a New Mexico lawyer). Public Citizen and so-called professional objector Lawrence
Schonbrun filed similar objections in this case. Id. A TLPJ press release asserts that the
proposed settlement was withdrawn and the settlement hearing was cancelled. TLPJ
Press Release, available online at <www.tlpj.orgpressreleases/53084_l.htm> (visited Apr
7, 2003).
" See Van Voris, Plaintiff Bar Divided, Natl L J at A12 (cited in note 33) (reporting
that TLPJ "enjoys financial and litigation support from the plaintiffs' bar" and quoting
Arthur Bryant of TLPJ that "[als an organization funded primarily by contributions from
trial lawyers, we did not go into this area lightly" and that "the problem of collusive class
settlements became impossible to ignore").
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The public interest group Public Citizen has intervened on
behalf of objectors in a wide variety of class actions. A 2000 report
of Public Citizen lists thirty-six class actions in which it had par-
ticipated since 1989.249 Public Citizen was extensively involved in
several of the most publicized class action cases of the 1990s.
Public Counsel objected to the proposed settlement of a class ac-
tion against the manufacturer of an allegedly defective cardiac
pacemaker because of the inability to opt out and a proposed 28
percent fee for class counsel of the fifty-seven million dollar pa-
tient benefit fund;25° opposed a proposed settlement that would
prevent objectors from opting out of claims against the maker of
the diet drug Redux;25' objected to the settlement of the asbestos
class action Amchem because of conflict of interest ethical issues
surrounding the side settlement of fourteen thousand pending
cases and future claims against the defending parties;252 repre-
sented class members in the silicone gel breast implants litiga-
tion who contended that the proposed settlement was not ad-
justed for inflation over its thirty year length, that spousal loss of
consortium claims were ignored, and that attorneys' fees needed
to be set in an adversary procedure; 253 objected to the proposed
coupon settlement in the General Motors Truck litigation involv-
ing side-saddle fuel tanks because of the reduction to five hun-
dred dollars of a one thousand dollar coupon if transferred, the
lack of a fair procedure used to set attorneys' fees, and defective
notice to the class;254 and acted as "principal objectors" in the Ford
Bronco II litigation, complaining that the settlement was "virtu-
ally worthless," that class counsel exaggerated the value of the
proposed settlement and that the attorneys' fees were excessive.255
29 Public Citizen, Public Citizen's Involvement in Class Action Settlements, available
online at <www.citizen.org/print-article.cfm?ID=552> (setting forth a detailed summary of
each of the thirty-six cases, including the status of case and the reason for intervening,
and listing attorneys who worked on the case, as well as the result) (visited Apr 7, 2003).
Id (citing Teletronics, 186 FRD 459).
Id (citing In re Diet Drugs Products Liability Litigation, 1999 US Dist Lexis 14881
(E D Pa)).
2 Id (citing Georgine v Amchem Products, Inc, 157 FRD 246 (E D Pa 1994), revd, 83
F3d 610 (3d Cir 1996), affd as Amchem Products, Inc v Windsor, 521 US 591 (1997)).
' Public Citizen's Involvement (cited in note 249) (citing In re Silicone Gel Breast
Implant Litigation, 1994 US Dist Lexis 12521 (N D Ala)).
Id (citing In re General Motors Pickup Truck Fuel Tank Product Liability Litiga-
tion, 55 F3d 768 (3d Cir 1995)).
Id (citing In re Ford Motor Co Bronco II Product Liability Litigation, 1995 US Dist
Lexis 3507, *19 (E D La) (agreeing with objectors that settlement had a value to class of
"effectively zero")).
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It is very difficult to arrive at an objective measure of the
success or benefit of a class action objection. The websites of
TLPJ and Public Citizen understandably refer to their success
stories as objectors.256 It seems logical that an objector's sweeten-
ing of the payout to class members evidences that the objection
has achieved success. Yet, additional payments to class members
could be little more than an effort to buy out a public interest ob-
jector and reach a final settlement that will be approved by the
court without objection. Payments to public interest group class
action objectors will not resemble the typical extortionist direct
payment to private practitioners, but are more likely to be in the
form of payments to the class. Such payments to class members
might be considered a mild, more positive form of buyoff that does
not merit the term "extortion."
The Rand study of class actions took a position strongly sup-
portive of public interest group intervention into the class action
process. While appropriately cautioning that such entities "have
their own policy agendas," it reasoned that public interest groups
"may be a source of more impartial advice to judges" and that
public interest groups play an important role "in calling attention
to questionable class action practices."257
Examination of the results obtained by public interest
groups' class action objections supports the relatively positive
endorsement of the Rand study. An award of attorneys' fees
seems the easiest yardstick of success for public interest group
objections. A court would not award an objector fees without con-
cluding that the objection had meaningfully aided the court and
the settlement approval process .2 " For example, a district court
' See, for example, id (referring to a "smashing victory" in the appeal from the pro-
posed settlement in the GM side-saddle truck class action, describing the trial court's
"comprehensive, forceful opinion, addressing all of the issues that we raised" in the vehicle
leasing class action, Clement v American Honda Finance Corp, 176 FRD 15 (D Conn
1998), characterizing the result in the Third Circuit Georgine decision as a "smashing
victory" in a "trumped-up suit," and characterizing the defeat of a non-opt out settlement
in the Hayden arsenic class action case, Hayden v Atochem North American, Inc, 2000 US
App LEXIS 4828 (5th Cir), as a "significant accomplishment").
"7 Hensler, Class Action Dilemmas at 494-95 (cited in note 39). See also Bob Van
Voris, Study Points to Class Action Abuses, Natl L J A4 (Nov 22, 1999) (reporting that a
Rand study recommended that "Uludges should ensure sufficient opportunity for objectors
to settlements to express their reservations in court").
... Despite authority that "[a]n objector to a class action settlement is not generally
entitled to an award of counsel fees," In re Domestic Air Transportation Antitrust Litiga-
tion, 148 FRD 297, 358 (N D Ga 1993), courts do grant attorneys' fees to class action objec-
tors who have had a positive impact on the litigation, sharpened debate of settlement
approval, or enhanced the class recovery. See, for example, Reynolds v Beneficial National
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awarded $59,211.56 to Public Citizen for its work representing an
objector in an insurance fraud class action brought against John
Hancock, emphasizing the benefit achieved by the objections.259
The court stressed that the objector's "attorneys' work did sub-
stantially benefit the class generally" by clarifying both the op-
tions available to the class and the size and nature of the pay-
ment to class counsel.26 9 Similarly, in In re Domestic Air Trans-
portation Antitrust Litigation,6  the court singled out the work of
Public Citizen and other objectors, concluding that the "objection
component in the settlement approval process ... has been cru-
cial to the Court's consideration of the fairness of the settlement
and was enhanced by the active participation of several fee appli-
cants."26 There, the court went on to approve the fee petition of
Public Citizen and several other objectors whom the court found
to have "significantly refined the issues germane to a considera-
tion of the fairness of this complex settlement . . . [and] trans-
formed the settlement hearing into a truly adversarial proceed-
ing.""3 In addition, a district court granted a $105,037 fee award
to Public Citizen in a class action involving an allegedly defective
heart valve where the objectors enhanced benefits for follow-up
surgeries and pushed compensation for the victims' spouses.264
Bank, 288 F3d 277, 288-89 (7th Cir 2002) (justifying the payment of attorneys' fees to
objectors on the theory of restitution and because it is "desirable to have as broad a range
of participants in the fairness hearing as possible" due to the risk of collusion over attor-
neys' fees); In re Prudential Insurance Co of America Sales Practices Litigation, 962 F
Supp 572, 593-94 (D NJ 1997) (collecting case authority holding that fees are appropriate
where the objector has conferred a benefit); In re Anchor Securities Litigation, 1991 WL
53651, *1 (E D NY) (citing City of Detroit v Grinnell Corp, 560 F2d 1093, 1098 (2d Cir
1977)) (allowing objectors' fees for "attorney whose actions have conferred a benefit upon a
given group or class of litigants").
" See Duhaime v John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company, 2 F Supp 2d 175,
176 (D Mass 1998).
26 Id. Public Citizen's objector client in this case was former Senator Howard Met-
zenbaum. He found the class action notice "impenetrable." Public Citizen's Involvement
(cited in note 249). Because the proposed settlement had an ADR component that would
adjudicate class members' fraud claims, Public Citizen sought to stagger the payment of
fees to class counsel in order to assess the results of the ADR system. Id. The court or-
dered the payment of these fees from an escrow balance of $16.5 million for class counsel
paid by the defendants. Id.
2 148 FRD 297 (N D Ga 1993).
Id at 359.
Id at 357-60 (cutting fee request of class counsel from twenty-four million dollars to
approximately sixteen million dollars, and allowing travel agents to redeem travel cou-
pons awarded in settlement, allowing nineteen thousand dollars in fees to Public Citizen,
and disallowing a fee award to objector Cooper whose filings were "confused and difficult
to follow").
26 See Bowling v Pfizer, Inc, 102 F3d 777, 779 (6th Cir 1996); Public Citizen's In-
volvement (cited in note 249) (noting that the public interest group represented objectors
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At the same time, measuring the success of an objector's in-
put by attorneys' fees would exclude some major victories
achieved by public interest groups. It is impossible to award at-
torneys' fees when the trial court rejects a proposed settlement.
This means that a public interest group is unlikely to receive any
attorneys' fees in some its most noteworthy victories, where it is
able to defeat a proposed settlement so thoroughly that the set-
tlement is never revived. For example, in objecting to the pro-
posed settlement in the Ford Bronco II class action, Public Citi-
zen advanced multiple objections to allegedly overly generous
settlement terms following the filing of seemingly serious prod-
ucts liability class claims involving the Ford Bronco's roll-over
problems. Class counsel had agreed to drop the consolidated class
actions in return for a warning sticker, driver safety information
already required by a federal agency, a vehicle inspection (that
was arguably valuable to the defendant in order to get many of
the 700,000 class members into a Ford automobile showroom),
and four million dollars in attorneys' fees.265 Public Citizen won a
major victory when the court refused to approve the settlement,
terming its value at "effectively zero."266 Nonetheless, the act of
defeating the settlement, clearly of benefit to the class action
process, netted no fee to the objector. Similarly, in the over
twenty class actions in which TLPJ has challenged class action
settlements, the public interest group sought fees in only two
cases.
267
Attorneys who represent objectors on behalf of public interest
groups should be capable monitors. They often possess substan-
tive expertise in the specialty subject matter of their interest
group. In addition, those lawyers who do class action objection
work for Public Citizen and TLPJ are repeat players, who possess
procedural expertise.268 Assuming they have enough information
to form a knowledgeable opinion, there is little reason to doubt
and was able to significantly enhance "reoperation benefits," achieve ten million dollars
for compensation of spouses, and reduce the attorneys' fee for class counsel from thirty-
three million dollars to $10.25 million).
26 See Public Citizen's Involvement (cited in note 249).
'" See In re Ford Motor Co Bronco II Products Liability Litigation, 1995 US Lexis
3507, *19 (E D La).
... Declaration of Arthur H. Bryant, TLPJ, 11 (cited in note 243).
m See Robert L. Rabin, Lawyers for Social Change: Perspectives on Public Interest
Law, 28 Stan L Rev 207, 232 (1976) (emphasizing the degree of specialization that exists
in "public interest law firm[s]" and noting that "the public interest law firm looks very
much like its corporate-commercial counterpart").
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their ability to evaluate whether class counsel and the defendant
have fairly settled a class action.
Public interest groups should have adequate incentives to
monitor complex class action maneuvers. Public choice theory's
focus on free-riding problems can make the formation and influ-
ence of public interest groups seem illogical at best, and impotent
at worst.6 9 Yet, some public interest groups have achieved great
legislative and litigation successes. 7' Daniel Farber has asserted
that "ideology clearly plays a critical role in the formation and
growth of these groups."27 Robert Rabin has stressed the focused
ideology and commitment that serves to give litigation public in-
terest groups "organizing power."272 It seems logical to conclude
that the attorneys who monitor class action performance for these
public interest group objectors are highly motivated to reach re-
sults consistent with the overall mission of their interest group."'
See Daniel Shaviro, Beyond Public Choice and Public Interest: A Study of the Legis-
lative Process as Illustrated by Tax Legislation in the 1980s, 139 U Pa L Rev 1, 94-95
(1990) (describing the "paradox" of interest group formation and asserting that free riding
should be "fatal" to interest group activities).
27 See, for example, id at 43-44 (noting the interest groups are often 'well-financed
and influential"); Helen M. Ingram and Dean E. Mann, Interest Groups and Environ-
mental Policy, in James P. Lester, ed, Environmental Politics and Policy: Theories and
Evidence 136-42 (Duke 1989) (suggesting that Sierra Club, NRDC, and Environmental
Defense Fund are successful organizations); Rabin, 28 Stan L Rev at 209-10, 257-58
(cited in note 268) (noting the successes of the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, the ACLU,
and several different environmental groups).
"' Daniel A. Farber, Politics and Procedure in Environmental Law, 8 J L, Econ, & Org
59, 74 (1992).
" Rabin, 28 Stan L Rev at 220-21 (cited in note 268) (referring to the "singular focus"
of successful public interest groups as "indispensable as an organizing device" and stress-
ing need for public interest groups to agree on relatively general principles).
" Farber, 9 J L, Econ, & Org at 74 (cited in note 271) (noting that successful envi-
ronmental public interest groups are "likely to involve individuals with exceptionally high
levels of ideological commitment"). Not surprisingly, public interest groups have articu-
lated mission statements. See, for example, National Association of Consumer Advocates,
Mission Statement, available online at <http://www.naca.net/about.htm> (describing
NACA's mission "to promote justice for all consumers by maintaining a forum for commu-
nication, networking, and information sharing among consumer advocates across the
country and by serving as a voice for its members and consumers in the ongoing struggle
to curb unfair and abusive business practices that adversely affect consumers") (visited
Aug 9, 2003); Trial Lawyers for Public Justice, Our Mission, available online at
<http://www.tlpj.org/mission.htm> (setting forth mission "through creative litigation,
public education and innovative work with the broader public interest community ... [to]
protect people and the environment; hold accountable those who abuse power; challenge
governmental, corporate and individual wrongdoing; increase access to the courts, combat
threats to our justice system; and inspire lawyers and others to serve the public interest")
(visited Apr 7, 2003).
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C. Court-appointed Guardians as Objectors
While much less common than the filing of objections by the
state or by committed public interest groups, court-appointed
guardians ad litem and adjuncts have provided a basis for mean-
ingful objections to proposed settlements in class actions. For ex-
ample, the trial court appointed a guardian ad litem to represent
the interest of future claimants to a proposed settlement fund in
the Ahearn v Fibreboard Corp274 asbestos exposure class action."5
The guardian raised useful objections to the proposed settlement
that called for a limited cash outlay by the defendant corporation
of ten million dollars and ignored the firm's asset value. 76 Using
powers to appoint a technical expert under Rule 54(d)(2)(D) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a district judge appointed a "fee
examiner" to analyze the fairness of a fee request from the lead
counsel in a complicated, Multi-District Litigation (MDL) set of
class actions alleging insurance fraud.277 Judge Pointer appointed
special guardians for subclasses in the silicone gel breast im-
plants litigation. Judge Lifland appointed a legal representative
that he alternatively referred to as a guardian, amicus curiae, or
4' 162 FRD 505, (E D Tex 1995), affd as In re Asbestos Litigation, 90 F3d 963 (5th Cir
1996), vacated and remanded, 521 US 591 (1997), affd on remand, 134 F3d 668 (5th Cir
1998), revd, Ortiz, 527 US 815.
... Green, 30 UC Davis L Rev at 799 (cited in note 9) (noting that Eric Green was
appointed as guardian ad litem for the class in Ahearn); Coffee, 95 Colum L Rev at 1420
(cited in note 1) (noting that "only Ahearn gave any recognition to the special position of
future claimants by appointing a guardian ad litem").
... See Coffee, 95 Colum L Rev at 1401-02 (cited in note 1) (noting objections by the
guardian and his argument that "Fibreboard's value ... might be as high as $250 to $300
million").
... See Prudential Insurance, 962 F Supp at 575-76, 576 n 22 (D NJ 1997) (noting a
court order of Nov 6, 1996 appointing an independent fee examiner "to assist the Court in
determining an appropriate award of attorneys' fees," granting the examiner authority to
examine documents relating to task, concluding that the seventy page report of the exam-
iner showed a "professional approach to [a] laborious task," basing authority under Rule
54(d)(2)(D) rather than under special master authority of Rule 53, and reviewing de novo,
but refusing to adopt the report of fee examiner), affd, 148 F3d 283, 330 (3d Cir 1998)(noting that the fee examiner found the ninety million dollar fee to be reasonable and fair
and that this fee and the appointment of the examiner were both challenged by an attor-
ney objector who was later sanctioned for his behavior). Rule 54(d)(2)(D) specifically em-
powers the district court to, by local rule, establish procedures to resolve attorneys' fees
battles "without extensive evidentiary hearings" and to refer attorneys' fee issues to a
special master. FRCP 54(d)(2)(D). It appears that the district judge in this case appointed
an adjunct without using a designated special master or a particular local rule and, in-
stead, may have been relying on unspecified inherent powers.
... Coffee, 95 Colum L Rev at 1420, 1406 (cited in note 1) (stating that breast implant
settlement was "negotiated in a virtual fishbowl of public disclosure and debate").
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examiner to represent future claimants in the Johns-Manville
Corporation bankruptcy.
27 9
The selection of court-appointed guardians to represent the
interests of absentees in the landmark notice case of Mullane il-
lustrates early judicial use of the technique of appointing a
guardian for a class.28° In Mullane, New York legislation permit-
ted the creation of common trust funds comprised of small and
moderate sized trusts to take advantage of scale economies in
trust administration.28 New York law required the trust compa-
nies to hold periodic accountings of their trust administration to
provide a degree of closure to settle the accounts.282 In these ac-
tions, the plaintiff trust company would seek judicial approval of
its work. In the Mullane litigation, no other parties appeared,
and the court appointed Kenneth Mullane as the guardian and
attorney for income beneficiaries and James Vaughn as a guard-
ian for principal beneficiaries.283 Mullane challenged the jurisdic-
tion of the court and the notice to those beneficiaries with known
names and addresses.284
While Mullane was not filed as a class action, it certainly in-
volved aggregative techniques. The accounting actions mandated
under New York law worked an effect much like a defendant
class action. The trust company was required to file a lawsuit,
and the only possible adversary parties were the set of beneficiar-
ies of the trust. The court was required by the legislation to ap-
279 See In re Johns-Manville Corporation, 36 Bankr 743, 757-59 (S D NY 1984) (noting
a court's power to appoint a guardian where there is an immediate need to determine the
rights affecting unknown parties).
339 US at 315 (holding that use of publication notice to notify out of state benefici-
aries of pooled trusts violated due process).
"' 2001 NY Laws § 100-C.
w2 Id.
' Presumably, the court appointed two guardians because of the potentially antago-
nistic positions of the income and principal beneficiaries. If the income beneficiaries failed
to claim income that was rightfully theirs, the principal beneficiaries would see their
investments increase. In other words, the latter group would be better off if notice to in-
come beneficiaries was deficient. Judicial appointment of guardians for any income or
principal beneficiary having an interest in the accounting of the trust was mandated by
statute. See 2001 NY Laws § 100c(6); Mullane, 339 US at 310 (stating that two guardians
were appointed pursuant to a New York common trust fund legislation). The guardian for
the principal beneficiaries had a second reason to not challenge the adequacy of notice
because New York law allowed the expenses of trust administration to be taken out of the
trust corpus and were thus payable from principal. See Richard D. Freer and Wendy
Collins Perdue, Civil Procedure: Cases, Materials and Questions 164 (Anderson 3d ed
2001) (citing In re Bank of New York, 67 NY 2d 444, 448 (1946)); In re Continental Bank &
Trust Co, 67 NY S2d 806, 807 (1946).
' Freer and Perdue, Civil Procedure at 311.
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point guardians.28 The income and principal beneficiaries were
really subclasses, and those likely to complain about the trust
administration were close to the position of class action objectors.
In Mullane, counsel for the objector was complaining about the
lack of information in the class action notice.28 6 It is interesting-
and probably not accidental-that Justice Jackson's Mullane
opinion referred to the "interests" of the beneficiaries of the trusts
and asserted that the "individual interest does not stand alone
but is identical with that of a class."'87 While not technically a
class action, the Mullane holding represents an early success
story of aggregative justice demonstrating that a court-appointed
attorney guardian can monitor the behavior of an alleged fiduci-
ary. It is a classic example of a court making use of a legislative
scheme to resolve a predictable monitoring problem in advance
and to make use of adjunct powers to enlist additional help in the
difficult task of monitoring. Mullane also provides evidence that a
guardian can monitor effectively and is not necessarily impotent,
despite a structural lack of symmetrical information about the
litigation at the time of appointment.
The theory of appointing a guardian ad litem is deceptively
simple. The guardian will represent the interests of the absent
class members and thereby monitor the behavior of class and de-
fense counsel during settlement negotiations."' The thrust of the
guardian's work in the class action context is to create a fuss re-
garding a potentially unfair class action settlement.8 9 The guard-
ian constitutes a sort of adversary substitute by providing a de-
gree of adversary proceedings often lacking in class actions. The
guardian takes up the devil's advocate role as an aid to provide a
' See 2001 NY Laws § 100c(6) (requiring appointment of guardian for beneficiaries
who have an interest in the accounting of the common trust fund).
See Mullane, 339 US at 311.
Id at 319 (emphasis added). Justice Jackson also used class action language helpful
to the 1966 revision of Rule 23 when he said that notice "reasonably certain to reach most
of those interested in objecting is likely to safeguard the interests of all." Id. This language
forms the present analytic basis for not requiring universal notice in all types of class
actions.
For a general discussion see, Sylvia R. Lazos, Note, Abuse in Plaintiff Class Action
Settlements: The Need for a Guardian During Pretrial Settlement Negotiations, 84 Mich L
Rev 308 (1984).
' See, for example, Cooper, 40 Ariz L Rev at 950 (cited in note 134) (advocating a role
for guardians aiding the court in evaluating the fairness of a proposed class action settle-
ment).
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voice to the court."' In Professor Cooper's words, it "may be de-
sirable to appoint some form of independent representative for
the claimants that is distinguished from [class] counsel."2 91 Simi-
larly, Professor Resnik has urged that "judges will have to turn
settlement hearings into a closer approximation of adjudication
than they have in the past."92 Presumably, the guardian will
monitor the performance of class counsel and take care to publi-
cize any sweetheart deals.
In one variation of the guardian concept, the guardian does
not represent a party, but is an adjunct to the court and prepares
a written report evaluating a proposed settlement.2 93 This variant
recognizes that a guardian ad litem is conceptually an officer of
the court under the court's supervision and control.294 Without the
"guardian" concept, courts have appointed special masters to aid
in formulating class action settlements.295
Haas v Pittsburgh National Bank296 is illustrative of the idea
that the court appoints a guardian ad litem to represent the in-
terests of absent class members. 97  In Haas, the court-
responding to an attorneys' fee petition by class counsel-
unilaterally selected a guardian ad litem for the class and was
immediately confronted with class counsel's motion to vacate the
appointment.298 In summarily denying the motion to vacate, the
court reasoned that the appointment filled a void created by the
See Sylvia R. Lazos, Note, 84 Mich L Rev at 328 (cited in note 288) (setting out
need for a "devil's advocate" to aid the court in evaluating a proposed settlement and urg-
ing that the mediator play a mediating role in helping the parties reach a compromise).
" Cooper, 40 Ariz L Rev at 950 (cited in note 134) (advocating that the "settlement
process can be structured by the court by designating a variety of participants who must
be heard").
' Judith Resnik, Money Matters: Judicial Market Interventions Creating Subsidies
and Awarding Fees and Costs in Individual and Aggregate Litigation, 148 U Pa L Rev
2119, 2161 (2000) (arguing that courts need to act to create an adversary contest when
structuring class action settlement hearings).
2 Lazos, Note 84 Mich L Rev at 329 (cited in note 288) (calling for a written report to
the court listing the strengths and weaknesses of each side's case).
See generally, Note, Guardians Ad Litem, 45 Iowa L Rev 376, 386-87 (1960) (defin-
ing a guardian ad litem as one appointed for the limited purpose of representing a party
under "disability" and stressing that the guardian ad litem is an officer of the court who
acts "under the close control and supervision of the court").
2 See, for example, McLendon v Continental Group, Inc, 749 F Supp 582, 612 (D NJ
1989) (appointing Professor George Priest as a special master in an ERISA class action
involving an alleged plan to avoid pension liabilities, with specific direction that the spe-
cial master was to assist parties in settlement and to aid in determining the amounts due
to the class members).
77 FRD 382 (W D Pa 1977).
27 Id at 383.
Id.
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defendant's "total indifference" to the fee request of class counsel
and allowed the judge to stay impartial and avoid playing the role
of devil's advocate regarding the propriety of the fee request. 99
The court emphasized that the input of the guardian would cre-
ate a true adversarial proceeding, essential in a small stakes
class action where, "not surprisingly, there is normally no class
member participation."
3 °°
Individuals appointed to be guardians ad litem in a class ac-
tion should possess the stature and expertise essential to monitor
a proposed class action settlement. They surely have greater
monitoring potential than the typical absent class member. Par-
ticularly in class actions involving substantial stakes, appoint-
ment of a guardian or special master should be given careful con-
sideration to ensure that some sort of adversary consideration of
the proposed settlement is provided to the court.
My enthusiasm for the promise inherent in a more system-
atic appointment of guardians to aid the class action approval
process should not be taken as an unqualified endorsement. The
lack of information and the timing of a guardian's appointment
could present problems. Assume that a trial court appoints a
guardian for a subclass after a proposed settlement has been ne-
gotiated. The guardian appointed may lack any knowledge about
the dispute itself or the settlement negotiations. The guardian
will usually be playing information catch-up when compared to
the defendant and class counsel's much greater knowledge about
the settlement. It may be too much to hope that the information
disadvantage of the guardian can be overcome by expertise and
the very best of intentions. It is difficult to imagine that a court-
appointed subclass guardian could negotiate knowledgeably soon
after appointment.3 1' Guardians need to be appointed early in the
process and must be afforded access to necessary information.
Id at 383.
Haas, 77 FRD at 383. See also Miller v Mackey International, Inc, 70 FRD 533, 535
(S D Fla 1976) (appointing a guardian to allow the court to stay neutral over the objection
for class counsel, reasoning that appointment is appropriate "where there is litigation
between a guardian and a ward-herein, the attorneys for the class and the class," and
basing power to appoint within inherent scope of Rule 23(d)).
3111 See, for example, Brian Wolfman and Alan B. Morrison, Representing the Unrepre-
sented in Class Actions Seeking Monetary Relief, 71 NYU L Rev 439, 480 (1996) (noting
that the court appointed a guardian in Ahearn too late because the proposed settlement
bargaining had already occurred and advocating a "requirement that future class mem-
bers always have separate representation during the original settlement negotiation proc-
ess"). Compare Coffee, 95 Colum L Rev at 1446 (cited in note 1) (pointing out that the
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The guardian's position should be compared to that of the
ultimate class action guardian-the trial judge who must some-
how evaluate the fairness and efficiency of the class action set-
tlement. The existing literature seems uniformly negative on the
court's ability to monitor class action settlements effectively. 2
Evaluating settlement fairness is a demanding task and one for
which courts are ill equipped and have little experience.0 ' Yet,
the sitting district judge who has presided over the class action
would seemingly know more about the case and the attorneys
than the guardian appointed to assist in monitoring would know.
The court would have spent time and effort getting to know the
issues and counsel in the class action. In contrast, the guardian
often comes in to the case far too late and inevitably is in an infe-
rior position from an informational perspective. At worst, the rou-
tine appointment of guardians to consider objecting to proposed
class action settlements might institutionalize the passing of the
buck from the trial judge, who is to scrutinize the possible set-
tlement, to an uninformed guardian who is beholden to the judge.
There have been times when a guardian could aid the moni-
toring process, as illustrated by the Ahearn litigation and the
strategic appointment of a guardian ad litem for the class in se-
lective fee applications.0 4 The guardian can be an effective moni-
tor when appointed in a timely fashion (prior to a key settlement
negotiation, rather than after it has occurred, where the guardian
has a carefully focused and narrow task, and is afforded access to
relevant information). Some ability to take limited discovery
seems essential for the guardian to play a positive role. This, of
course, means that to be effective, the guardian needs resources
to finance the necessary discovery.
guardian ad litem for future claimants is not adequate "because a guardian is not in a
position to negotiate the settlement's terms").
' See text accompanying notes 15-16; Coffee and Koniak, Latest Class Action Scam,
Wall St J Section All (cited in note 15) (questioning the incentives of the district judge to
adequately resist parties who want to settle class actions and who are advancing a specific
proposed settlement and asserting that the judge has "too little information to recognize
when the settlement is collusive"); Lazos, Note, 84 Mich L Rev at 321 (cited in note 288)
(explaining that the lack of an adversary contest at a typical fairness hearing "forces the
court into an unjustified passivity" because usually the court lacks a devil's advocate and
information).
' See Hensler, Class Action Dilemmas at 486-87 (cited in note 39) (stressing the lack
of guidance available to judges who must evaluate class action settlements); Bainbridge
and Gulati, 51 Emory L J at 139-40 (cited in note 15) (noting the bounded rationality of
judges supervising complex litigation).
' See Wolfman and Morrison, 71 NYU L Rev at 480 (cited in note 301) (noting the
appointment of a guardian in Ahearn litigation).
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The guardian ad litem might be seen as an adjunct to an Ar-
ticle III judge,"5 selected to represent the interests of a subclass
of class action absentees. A guardian is a type of court-appointed
objector. There may be other judicial adjuncts that can play a
similar role in monitoring class action settlements. For example,
the court might appoint a special master, appoint a guardian who
answers to the district judge, or assign a federal Magistrate
Judge to supervise the settlement process. Judge Robert E. Jones
appointed a special master to supervise the administration of the
settlement in the oriented strand home siding litigation. °6 Judge
Lifland appointed an adjunct representative of future claimants
to the Johns-Manville bankruptcy case without settling on a for-
mal title, suggesting that the appointment could be done as a
guardian, amicus curiae, or an examiner.0 7 District judges have
appointed special masters to help adjudicate facts in class ac-
tions.3 8 Alternatively, district judges can appoint their own ex-
pert witnesses under Federal Rule of Evidence 706.09 Guardians
should be considered a part of the procedural weaponry available
to the busy trial judge seeking impartial information in order to
decide whether or not a class action settlement is fair.
Judicial adjuncts and appointed guardians ad litem are not
interchangeable. Each occupies a unique and distinct position in
terms of their ultimate allegiance in a class action. The appointed
guardian in Ahearn represented the interests of future claimants.
Although the guardian's court supervision might create a poten-
tial conflict in roles, he owed a fiduciary obligation to those repre-
sented.310 Owing a duty to this specific set of absent class mem-
bers or to a subclass is far different than the position of a special
US Const, Art III (outlining the powers of the federal judiciary).
See Hensler, Class Action Dilemmas at 360-63 (cited in note 39) (describing the
appointment of former Oregon Supreme Court Justice Richard Unis as special master to
manage the administration and implementation of the many features of the claims
brought under the settlement).
311 See In re Johns-Manville Corp, 36 Bankr 743, 759-60 (S D NY 1984) (suggesting
that terming the legal representative an "examiner" was consistent with § 1104(b) of the
Bankruptcy Code, but also was limited by scope of the bankruptcy reorganization context).
See Lazos, Note, 84 Mich L Rev at 327 n 7 (cited in note 288) (citing Officers for
Justice v. Civil Service Commission, 473 F Supp 801, 818 (N D Cal 1979), a case where
special master presided over the damages distribution).
' See Hensler, Class Action Dilemmas at 495 (cited in note 39) (urging that federal
judges seek assistance in evaluating the quality of settlements and pointing out their
authority to appoint their own experts under Rule 706).
"' See Note, 45 Iowa L Rev 387 (cited in note 294) (taking the position that the guard-
ian ad litem acts in a fiduciary capacity and has a general duty to represent the ward).
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master, whose ultimate principal is the district judge." A judicial
adjunct such as the fee examiner in the Prudential Insurance
MDL litigation reports to the judge in a way consistent with the
special master paradigm."2 While his work might benefit absen-
tees, he owes no duties to the class members. This is not to sug-
gest that the fee examiner cannot be helpful to absent class
members. I merely point out that these public sector generic
guardians each occupy a different structural position in terms of
their ultimate loyalties. There may even be situations where the
court could profit by appointing both a guardian to represent the
absent class members and a special master to help put together a
more appropriate settlement. There is no reason that these de-
vices need to work in isolation, and there can be advantages to
their use in tandem.
CONCLUSION
Class action objectors have a bad reputation. Some theorists
posit that they are claim jumpers who free ride off of the efforts of
the original class counsel, who has researched the case's legal
theory, entered into a time-consuming relationship with a client,
gathered and assessed facts underlying the claim, and filed suit.
The objector free-riding story is made even worse because class
action objectors effectively poach the considerable time and effort
spent by class counsel and defense attorneys negotiating a pro-
posed settlement. The clients of class action objectors have mini-
mal ability to monitor the performance of their attorneys. Condi-
tions for collusion are great in the class action objection context.
Class action mythology suggests that there is a cadre of profes-
sional objectors who regularly and systematically seek extortion-
ist buyouts by the class and defense counsel. In return for a pay-
off to the objecting lawyer, it is agreed that the objection will be
withdrawn or that a notice of appeal will be retracted. In this
story, the overworked and all too human judge sits passively,
only too happy to see the objection go away, or blissfully unaware
that a threatened objection was ever registered.
... See FRCP 53(c) (allowing the trial court to circumscribe the powers of a master);
Charles A. Wright and Mary K. Kane, Law of Federal Courts 701-02 (6th ed 2002) (stress-
ing the 'extensive power" of an Article III judge over litigation).
"' The fee examiner in this case, Stephen Greenberg, submitted a Report and Recom-
mendation to the trial judge about three months after Greenberg's appointment. Pruden-
tial Insurance, 148 F3d at 330.
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This review of the activities of class action objectors suggests
that some of the above story is true. Some objectors-perhaps the
least popular parties in the history of civil procedure-have
earned their reputation. A major theme of this Article, however,
is that not all class action objectors have behaved badly or pro-
vided unproductive input. There often appears to be little or no
objection activity. Moreover, some courts have gone out of their
way to praise the input of class action objectors for shedding new
light on issues and providing an adversarial contest, rather than
the silent, private settlement dance that all too often character-
izes a class action settlement. Sometimes, courts stir up objec-
tions by appointing guardians for subclasses. States and public
interest groups often raise objections to class action settlements
that bear little resemblance to the extortion scenario. These pub-
lic sector objectors march to the beat of a different drummer in
their motivation and they bring to the case specialist attorneys
better able to monitor the performance of the attorneys who have
negotiated a class action settlement. The normal agency cost
criticisms of class action objections seem less severe for these
public sector objectors.
Recent developments cast objectors in a more positive light.
Both the proposed amendments to Rule 23 and recent case law
value the input of class action objectors and seemingly ignore the
free-riding extortionist story. The proposed amendments to Rule
23 are designed to strengthen the problematic process of settle-
ment review." 3 The right to object seems firmly enshrined in view
of the likely approval of proposed Rules 23(e)(4)(A) and 23(h)(2),
granting both a general right to object to an absent class member
and a more specific right to object to attorneys fees. Once made,
objections will need court approval to be withdrawn under pro-
posed Rule 23(e)(4). 4 Devlin's approval of appeals by objectors
and Judge Posner's Reynolds opinion-justifying an award of at-
torneys' fees to those objectors who provided beneficial input-
provide more good news for objectors. These developments are
buttressed by the endorsement of class action objectors in the in-
fluential Rand study of class actions.
A more balanced reaction to class action objections is needed.
The nature of a class action objection is analytically similar to the
"' See Committee Note, 201 FRD at 617 (cited in note 38) (stating that the amend-
ments to Rule 23 are "to strengthen the process of reviewing proposed class-action settle-
ments").
34 See FRCP 23(e)(4).
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procedure of intervention. Courts have cobbled together an effi-
cient and fair solution to intervention in civil cases. Proposed in-
tervention is granted only when it is likely to be helpful to a
court.31' Duplicative intervention motions are denied, but poten-
tially beneficial intervention requests-those that can enhance
judicial output or accuracy-are granted.316
Policy relating to objectors may be headed in the right direc-
tion-that of using a neutral screening approach, much like in-
tervention, to assess the class action objector. Class action objec-
tors can hurt or help litigation, much like intervenors.1 7 Whether
objectors receive attorneys' fees will have a significant influence
on the nature and degree of potentially counterproductive class
action objection activity. Courts should adopt an approach that
strictly evaluates the input of objectors to determine if it is of sig-
nificant value in relation to the information already in the case.
District judges need the discretion to deny any attorneys' fee re-
quest of any objector that does not genuinely help the case. Like
intervention petitions, class action objections should be viewed as
neutral and screened carefully before they are rewarded, but not
dismissed out of hand because of a fear of free riding.
Figure 2 depicts an imperfect, but improved, modern posi-
tioning of objectors and judges.
"' See Brunet, 12 Ga L Rev at 738 (cited in note 41); see also, Natural Resources De-
fense Council, Inc v Tennessee Valley Authority, 340 F Supp 400, 408-09 (S D NY 1971),
rev'd on other grounds, 459 F2d 235 (2d Cir 1972) (noting the ability of proposed interve-
nor to clarify issues presented in the litigation).
316 See Part II.
See Brief for Respondents, Devlin v Scardelletti at 31 (pointing out that the "reality
of the matter is that objectors to class action settlements come in all different shapes and
sizes: some retain legal counsel and make a substantial commitment of time, energy and
resources to the process, whereas others do not retain legal counsel and are content to file
a piece of paper containing some variant of'I object' or 'This is a terrible deal'").
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Figume 2
POST DEVLIN POSMrON OF OBECTORS
L 
Tems
CLASS COUNSEL - M.FNDAN
The objectors are far closer to the settlement process than in
Figure 1. They have access to settlement information from the
potential discovery they can reap. Objectors also have the lever-
age of the Devlin case that should net them increased respect
from class counsel and defendants, who now must consider objec-
tors as players in the class action settlement process. Figure 2
places the trial judge at the top of the settlement triangle. Admit-
tedly, the judge is still not within the triangle as a party to the
settlement negotiations. Such a development is impractical and
potentially unwise because the nature of judging requires some
degree of distance from the parties-who must necessarily hold
great incentives to settle and who need significant information to
craft a fair and durable settlement. Unlike Figure 1, the court in
Figure 2 is closer to the process, at the very apex of the settle-
ment triangle. The modern judge receives additional input from
the class action objector. Just as important, the potential of ap-
peals by dissatisfied class action objectors, created by Devlin,
gives the court the incentive to provide objectors a day in court
and a further incentive to participate meaningfully in the class
action settlement in order to avoid the possibility of reversal. In
short, the structure of class action settlements, while admittedly
still imperfect, is improving due to a confluence of the doctrines
in Devlin, changes in Rule 23, appellate decisions giving objectors
additional clout, and the presence of a new breed of public sector
objectors.
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